MILITARY SERVICE SYSTEM 565
The fifth measure was referred to as allocations (punjang) that provincial gov-
ernors, and provincial army and navy commanders were required to raise any
way they could and pay to the central government to offset the loss of revenue
from the one-p 'il tax cut. As Ch'a Munsop has pointed out, the two-mal rice tax
on land (kyalmi) was dropped, as one might have expected, and replaced with
the vague provincial allotments (punjang), which allowed provincial officials
carte blanche in raising funds, and may have done more to offset the benefits of
the tax cut than any other item.^36
Hong had reported the hue and cry raised in the provinces over the one-p'il
levy on the specially selected military officers after 1750. At the time Yongjo
denied that he had intended the measure to be construed in any way as a "tax
on the leisured" (yup '0) or a household cash tax. He had only placed a levy on
them because he wanted to reducc the excessive tax burden borne by commoner
men of good status. which had been caused not by the men of leisurc themselves,
but by the corruption ofthe district magistrates over the years! He hoped to gloss
the issue of taxing yangban by calling it something other than a tax - a tactic
that had been tried as far back as 1626. He probably did believe, however, that
yangban should be preserved from a military service tax, not only because he
was afraid of a yangban-Icd rebellion, but because he also supported the idea
of a status-based society.37
After listening to a raft of complaints about his new taxes designed to make
up for lost revenue, Yongjo promulgated the order for the "rice surtax on land"
(kyoZmi) in the ninth month of 175 I.3X He ordered a surtax of two mal of grain
or five chon of cash per kyal of land in six provinces (exclusive of the northern
two), and he estimated the total revenue, calculated in terms of cash, at about
320,000 yang for an average crop year.^39 In addition, he also set the terms for
the use of grain loan interest (hoerok), and then conceded that the fine on stu-
dent dropouts designated specially selected military officers was necessary to
replace revenue lost by the tax cut on peasants of good status.
Conclusion
The denouement of the equal-service debate produced a couple of ironic situa-
tions. In his first public meeting outside the palace in 1750 Yongjo had declared
that he had given thoughtful consideration to a special tax on idle yangban (yup 0)
but had decided to rule it out. He asked the people to decide between a surtax
on land or a nondiscriminatory household tax on people of all statuses. Shortly
thereafter he announced he had rejected all those alternatives in favor of a tax
cut, but in a desperate search for funds by 1752, Yongjo ended up by imposing
a tax on idle yangban and a surtax on land, in addition to creating a number of
other new taxes. He had rejected a household tax because of the objections of
the defenders of yangban privilege against either military service or taxes, but
the spcciallcvy on school dropouts (specially selected military officers) was only
a thinly disguised tax on yangban. The protest raised over this measure proba-