682 REFORM OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONalways have troops under their command because half the men in a district were
assigned to the governor and the other half to the provincial military comman-
der. Men could be under the governor in the morning and then find themselves
shifted to the command of the supreme field commander (Tow6nsu) sent out
from the capital later in the day. The overiappingjurisdiction of different offices
prevented unified control of the province by the governor while each of the mil-
itary commanders were left without enough troops. There was no connection
between one chain of command and another.
Kang recounted the experience of Yi Pongnam who was magistrate of
Namw6n (the Namwon-busa) in Ch6lla Province when the war broke out in 1592,
but then was transferred to be the magistrate of Naju (Naju-moksa), and shifted
to the post of defense commander (Pang'osa). Because his appointment to that
post was opposed, he was finally made provincial military commander (Choltosa).
The governor of Ch611a. Pak Hongno, was held responsible for defeats against
Japanese forces and was replaced by Hwang Sin, but Hwang found the gover-
nor's office in ruins and could not find any of the fifty-three provincial magis-
trates who had been able to mobilize any troops. Kang had been in charge of
the district of Tamyang when Namwon was surrounded by Japanese forces, but
the officials assigned by the capital to take charge of defense only showed up
after the military situation was already untenable. When the commanders and
a few aides finally arrived, there were no troops available even for ambush attacks
against the Japanese.
Kang's advice to the throne was to choose the best men for border comman-
ders on the basis of bravery, courage, talent, ability, and military merit without
respect to their rank, their careers as civil or military officials, or their pedigrees.
These men should thcn be appointed as border commanders of garrisons estab-
lished every 100 i (33 miles) near the past invasion points of the Japanese and
keep them in command for a period of twelve to fifteen years as the Sung emper-
ors had done. They should not be transferred to another post but only raised in
rank, and even if the petition box be filled with complaints against them, they
would not be dismissed or transferred until found guilty of a major crime.^2!
The gist of this discussion about governors and provincial officials was that
feudal and Japanese traditions could be adapted to the bureaucratic system by
long-term service to strengthen command and defense of frontier provinces,
and that the political threat to central power could be avoided by careful choice
of the best men for office. But this attitude had been disproved by the histori-
cal experience of disloyalty, especially in China and Japan. Yu's attitude that
education, proper recommendation, and review of official performance would
end the autonomous concentration of power by provincial governors and mil-
itary commanders was a naiVe, textbook exercise in purification of the ranks of
officialdom.