62 EARLY CHOSON DYNASTYof moral outrage. There was just no regular, peaceful, and easy mechanism in
the Confucian traditional monarchy for the replacement of immoral or incom-
petent kings without experiencing a political crisis, often accompanied by blood-
shed and retribution, and a severe split in political loyalties. Incompetence was
probably more of a problem than tyranny or immorality, because it did not con-
stitute sufficient grounds for replacement of a king even though the exercise of
his daily decision, or lack of it, wrought havoc for his people. As a result, Con-
fucian statecraft specialists accepted what they thought was the only practical
alternative, increased zeal in persuasion to wean the wayward monarch from
his immoral ways, and better advice for adopting better institutions for the
improvement of problems.Usurpation and DepositionKing T'aejong's violation of the normal order of succession in I398 and I400
established an unfortunate tradition of political interference and manipulation
that was extended when King Sejo usurped the throne in T 455 from his nephew,
the legitimate King Tanjong. In tyrannical fashion he subsequently sidestepped
the chain of command by ignoring the State Council and prime minister to exert
direct command over the Six Ministries. The animosity generated by Sejo's
usurpation poisoned the political atmosphere for the next half century and cre-
ated fear among Sejo's successors at any suggestion of illegitimacy in the royal
line. King Yonsan'gun at the turn of the century was paranoidal in his response
to this problem, and he chose not only to ignore the remonstrance of his Con-
fucian officials, but also to banish or execute those who failed to respond to his
slightest whims. Insisting on his right to demand complete obedience to his royal
commands, his actions passed beyond the limits of acceptability, and he was
deposed by a coup d' etat organized by the political survivors of his major purges.
Unfortunately, his very deposition led to the creation of a coalition of politi-
cal favorites who had to be rewarded for their political acumen, and the contin-
uation of special appointments, emoluments, and favors for the so-called merit
subjects who were the beneficiaries of the Confucian spoils system. By the mid-
dle of the sixteenth century the unity of the court was again riven, this time by
members of the P'ap'yong Yun clan who became rivals over the designation of
the royal successor. The rivals were cousins, brothers of two different queens (the
first and second queens of King Chungjong), and therefore uncles of the sons of
those queens. When the son of the second queen acceded to the throne in 1545
as King Myongjong, his supporters in the so-called Little Yun faction used the
opportunity to banish and execute members of the Big Yun group. They could
do this because the king was a minor and his mother, Queen Munjong, ruled the
country as regent at the time. I In this case, a single yangban clan created a polit-
ical firestorm over the royal succession, and their internal dispute could only be
resolved by the execution of their rivals - not the kind of regular succession mech-
anism that the Neo-Confucian founders of the dynasty had had in mind.