Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions. Yu Hyongwon and the Late Choson Dynasty - James B. Palais

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802 FINANCIAL REFORM AND THE ECONOMY

imperial court, and 1,388 sam for over 26,000 rolls of quality paper for the Ch'ing
emperor and his family - a total of 12,382 sam or 2 1.8 percent of taedong remit-
tances to the capital. Of these amounts, half the cotton tribute was reduced in
I7 I I. Other provinces had to pay a proportionate share ofthese amounts as well. 63
Provincial District Capital Agent Replaced. The taedong system also brought
in its wake a transformation in the supply of tribute items to the capital. Since
the mid-Koryo period each provincial district sent a commoner to the capital
under the system of compulsory labor service to serve as the district's capital
agent (Kyongjori or Kyongjuin). He was responsible for supervising the flow of
written communications between the district and the central government, and
orders from the throne were distributed through him to his district. The capital
agent only ceased acting as the conduit of edicts to districts in 1730, when King
YOngjo required that all royal orders and ministerial directives be funneled
through provincial governors. The district's capital agent also guaranteed the
attendance of rotating duty soldiers in the capital and rotating kiin clerks
responsible for wood and fuel supplies to capital bureaus, and had to pay the
cost for replacing any kiin or serviceman absent without leave. They provided
room and board for officials and clerks from their districts in their own homes
or those of their friends (reimbursed with interest by the district magistrate).
Since they also had to make advance payments of tribute items to the central
government when necessary, they were given the opportunity to reap large and
illicit profits as middlemen between the peasants or districts and the central gov-
ernment by selling quality tribute goods and purchasing cheaper items for pre-
sentation to the government under the pangnap method of profiteering.
Under the taedong system, however, the work of the district's capital agent
was no longer performed by a local clerk (hyangni) or commoner from the dis-
trict on rotating labor service, but by a resident of the capital hired as agent for
each district and paid a "service fee" (yakka) or salary. The province's Taedong
Agency in the capital used revenues received from the taedong tax to pay their
annual service fee of twenty sam in rice (for Cholla, fifteen sam for Ch'ungch'ong)
and to grant them funds for purchasing goods on the market to present to the
king or central bureaus in lieu of tribute payments. At times the capital agents
complained that the funds given them were too low for a reasonable profit despite
exhortations issued by high officials and government laws to provide liberal prices
and guarantee incentives for the private supply of commodities to the capital
without the system of forced supply.
On the other hand, the district's capital agent learned to utilize his position to
make large profits, primarily by making loans to commoners and clerks who
owed cloth or service payments or to magistrates who needed funds in advance
to meet government deadlines for tax payments or to pay for their food and lodg-
ing expenses. They profited by lending funds at rates as high as 10 percent per
month, and as their profits increased, the level of their "service fees" or salaries
rose by the eighteenth century to I 00 sam for agents of ordinary districts, 240
sam for the agent (chuin) of the provincial governor, 30 sam for the provincial

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