836 FINANCIAL REFORM AND THE ECONOMY
the taedong refoffi] as a means of eliminating tribute levies - could also be used
to finance almost the entire cost of administration, create a sufficient surplus to
convert unpaid clerks into compensated functionaries of the state, and replace
compulsory labor service with wage payments fortransportation and other work
performed for the state. His main goal was not simply financial reorganization,
but removing the economic causes of corruption and immorality in the bureau-
cracy and excessive labor service demands on the ordinary peasantry.
While this mode of thought suggests that Yu derived his inspiration for this
measure exclusively from the taedong reform ofthe seventeenth century, he also
sought justification in the Chinese classics and histories. Yu held that the prin-
ciple of open and legal financing of government service had been articulated by
the ancients and remained valid for all modes of government, whether feudal
or bureaucratic. All government began with the proposition that officials were
entitled to support by the people: "'Those who are ruled by others feed them;
those who rule others are fed by them. a principle that exists throughout the
world." Nevertheless, this obligation had to be regulated to prevent exploitation
of the people. The people were not to be taxed at a rate higher than 10 percent
of their income" "lest it cause harm to the cultivator," nor should the tax rate be
any less than IO percent in order that state finances be guaranteed. The lowest
ranking government official was entitled to a salary at least equivalent to the
income he would have received had he been left to cultivate his own fields, and
the highest officials were entitled to larger salaries to allow them to "treat their
close relatives with humaneness. Only after ensuring [that their salaries are suf-
ficient I will you be able to encourage a sense of shame (i.e., moral standards)
and achieve [good] rites and customs."43
These supposedly ancient and universal principles also required open and legal
responsibility and accountability, not the nonlegal, irresponsible, and arbitrary
methods of funding official income and costs that had developed over the years.
The expansion of the number of officials, particularly superfluous ones, had
strained government finance and led to a overall reduction of the level of salaries.
Not only were the highest officials left without adequate income, but the low-
est ranking officials had devised "lax and careless practices" to raise their incomes
and serve "their private interests."
Yu attempted to demonstrate in a separate study of the history of bureaucratic
salaries in China and Korea that not only in ancient times, but also in the bureau-
cratic period after the Ch'in and Han dynasties in China, full schedules for suf-
ficient salaries for ranked officials had been drawn up to ensure fairness.
According to the Rites of Chou, in Chou times the prime minister and two other
chief ministers first allocated ranks of nobility (chiieh) based on their virtue,
and then assigned salaries on the basis of merit or accomplishments. The size
of their salaries varied according to the length of time they served on duty. Ch'iu
Chtin of Ming times commented that titles of rank determined degrees of honor
and were prerequisite to an imperial salary grant, and both rank and salary were
the means by which the Son of Heaven could control officials, "respect virtue,