OFFICIAL SALARIES AND EXPENSES 853exempt land (kuppokchon), leaving about 750,000 kyol. Total national revenues
from this taxable land yielded a total of 600,000 sam of rice, which was about
three times the revenues of 180,000 sam from the land tax (120,000 sam for
paddy land and 60,000 sam from dry land). Kim found that the total taedong
revenue for 1769 was 565,225 sam, of which 315,853 sam (56 percent) was remit-
ted to the capital (sangnap) for the purchase of items that had previously been
remitted as tribute in kind. Han had mentioned a figure of 480,000 sam total
revenue for 1740, of which 240,000 s6m (50 percent) was remitted to the cap-
ital. Kim's estimate that 56 percent of national taedong taxes (or its equivalent)
was sent to the capital was a more accurate figure than Han's 50 percent since
he took into account wide-ranging provincial variety in the division of revenue
between the capital and the province. For example, P'yong'an Province retained
75 percent of their taedong revenues in the province, while Kyongsang Province
only kept 34 percent. Kim noticed that the fiscal crisis in the provinces increased
toward the end of the dynasty as the overall proportion of taedong revenues kept
in the provinces declined.?'
Flaws that were detrimental to the operation of the land tax naturally became
problems of the taedong tax as well. Kim pointed out that the system of grad-
ing the productivity of land for tax purposes in 1441 by measuring fertility and
weather conditions had virtually been abandoned since almost all land was graded
at the lowest or next-to-lowest category of fertility. This development meant that
the progressive feature of the land tax had been lost, and the only method for
easing taxes was a special royal order of exemption following investigation of
local conditions (taphOm). Kim found that for Kyonggi Province, for example,
between 1657 and 1760, a period of I I 1 years, Korean kings granted 38 reduc-
tions, or an average of I reduction for every 4 years. Only in 3 cases were all
taxes exempted, and most reductions varied from I to 3 mal/kyol.?4
Han Woo-keun found several examples of inefficient, useless, or corrupt inves-
tigations of crop damage in the early eighteenth century, such that peasants who
merited relief did not get it, and large landlords who did not deserve it received
them. In 1746, King Yongjo even forbade provincial governors from granting
damage exemptions on their own authority. Swidden fields were often registered
erroneously as land under constant cultivation and subjected to annual taxes. In
addition, land registration itself was hampered by corruption, so that much cul-
tivated land was left out of the records, contributing to low taxes for the wealthy
and oppressive and confiscatory taxes for the poor and unprotected small peas-
ants. Surcharges for fees or bribes increased real tax rates, and some powerful
landlords who took over the lands of smallholders had registered themselves as
the sole owner of the combined holdings, and collected taxes as virtual rent from
the real petty smallholders.
The concentration of land in the hands of the wealthy and the corruption of
officials and clerks in the administration of the land tax exacerbated the posi-
tion of poor peasants and tenants. As Kim Okki1n put it, the taedong reform did
provide some benefits to peasants who had been oppressed by the corruption of