928 FINANCIAL REFORM AND THE ECONOM Ythe familiar "check-off' (chomt'oe) tactic that tax clerks used to reject cloth on
the grounds of alleged inferiority. Third State Councilor Kim Togwon also
reported that public confidence in cash had declined because officials in the cap-
ital had been refusing to accept cash for tax payments. Sukchong adopted Kwon's
suggestions, but he maintained his decision to suspend further minting to cur-
tail the increase of cash in the capital market. Had Sukchong merely wanted to
increase revenues, he would not have suspended minting.('
Sukchong had minted cash without restraint between 1683 and 1689, but then
authorized a "temporary" ban on minting. He continued the ban to 169 I because
he was afraid of the possibility of reproducing the deleterious effects of an exces-
sive money supply. In the seventh month of 1691, he allowed Kaesong to mint
cash to provide funds for military expenses and entertaining Ch'ing envoys, but
he remained cautious about restraining the money supply to prevent inflation
and preserve the value of the currency, especially since Kaesong was the heart
of the cash economy outside the capital. He restricted coinage in Kaesong to
twenty smelters for a period of five months, and required that the Ministry of
Taxation inspect the quality of the coins. In J 692, he also allowed the Military
Training Agency to mint cash briefly under controlled regulations to provide for
defense costs for Kanghwa Island, and granted similar permission to the Anti-
Manchu Division (Ch'ongyungch'ong). Even though Sukchong allowed the
resumption of minting after 1691, he did not do so primarily to raise revenues
because he favored a conservative and restrictive control of the volume of cash'?
Probably for this reason government offices were still short of sufficient cash
revenue. In 1693 Minister of Rites Yu Myonghyon asked for additional funds
for famine relief - the Office of Benefiting the People had exhausted all its reserves
to counteract the drought that had been suffered in several provinces that year.
The Border Defense Command won Sukchong's approval for minting more cash
at the beginning of the fourth lunar month, but the supplies of copper had been
exhausted. Copper imports from Japan in official trade had only averaged between
26,000 to 29,000 kiln (catties) prior to J 678, and had increased to 300,000 kiln
a year by 1693, but the Border Defense Command reported that the three agen-
cies that were minting cash (presumably the Ministry of Taxation, Military Train-
ing Agency, and Central Division?) required more than 4,000 ch'ing (400,000
ki'in) to produce their quota of cash. The Office of Benefiting the People had
also been authorized to mint cash to meet its expenses, but there was no copper
available. Yu suggested that since the two military agencies had only been given
a twelve-month limitation on minting, on the first day of the first lunar month
in 1694 the Office of Benefiting the People should take over minting from the
Military Training Agency and the Anti-Manchu Division. In other words, the
amount of cash available was used for relief and military expenses, and imported
copper was not sufficient to allow further minting.
Chief State Councilor K won Taeun objected to the diffusion of minting among
several agencies because it had depleted the supply of copper, driven its price
sky high, and stimulated counterfeiting and the debasement of coins. Yu