to Ipqu-Nabium, the barber, a letter for information to Sîn-rËmËni, the judge, and
a letter of the assembly [puærum] to the honorable judges. Do not spare Ipqu-iliåu
during debate in the assembly! In accordance with the words that you and he speak
against each other in the assembly, the gentlemen will reprimand Ipqu-iliåu the
judge and they will send me a copy of their tablets. The gentleman [Nabium-
nΩœir] will inform the king according to the debate he will hear.
(van Soldt 1990 : no 2 , translation slightly modified).
Unfortunately, the subject of the dispute is not mentioned.
The details these records provide on the functioning of the assemblies are thus
frustratingly scarce and scholars have combed sundry sources from the third to the first
millennium to find more information. The combined data suggest that Mesopotamian
citizens had the right to be judged by their peers and occasionally this happened in so-
called assemblies. How these related to the bodies of judges, we do not know. Judges
regularly appear as speaking in an assembly (Seri 2005 : 168 ) and Hammurabi’s code
punishes a judge who reversed his opinion by unseating him “from his judgeship in the
assembly” (LH § 5 ). A gathering of judges and an assembly do not seem to have meant
the same, however. Evidence from the city-state of Assur, where merchants involved
in trade with Anatolia were very prominent, suggests that the assembly there actively
promoted commercial policy (Veenhof 2010 : 65 – 67 ). How far that extended beyond
court cases remains vague, however (Van De Mieroop 1997 : 128 ).
But, as is true for the English word “gathering,” the term puærumcan also be
understood as an ad hoc meeting of people with related interests (Charpin 2007 : 181 ).
The gatherings documented in early second millennium sources regularly are said to
be of “elders,” probably the heads of families, but some very specific groups, such as
innkeepers appear as well (van Soldt 1990 : no 89 ). It seems very possible that men
assembled whenever needed to make certain decisions, especially regarding legal
disputes. They would have been more mediators then than courts, and sometimes may
have addressed other business. The configuration of the group would have depended
on the nature of the case and the parties involved.
The existence of self-constituted groups of people was to the benefit of the state.
Power was in the hands of elites, which from late Early Dynastic times on formed the
entourage of what we call kings. Perforce the ruling elites had to interact with the
general population, which was much easier if it was organized into groups, whose
nature depended on the type of interaction: professional associations, clans, neigh-
borhoods, etc. It seems that each one of these groups could constitute a puærum. The
interactions required intermediaries whom both parties accepted as representative.
Again, we are much in the dark about these individuals; who selected them, what were
their areas of competence, how were they trained, and so on. The Ur III state, which
we consider to be highly bureaucratic, had a multitude of official titles, but there is little
clarity about what exactly people holding them did – and, not surprisingly, no scholar
so far has attempted a detailed analysis of Ur III officialdom (Sallaberger 1999 : 186 ).
The officials who represented the state to the people collected taxes and fees, levied
troops and requisitioned labor, and had to rely on the force of the law to obtain the
desired results. We know frustratingly little about the procedures involved, but it is
clear that abuse of power was as tempting in ancient Mesopotamia as it is today:
officials who acted on behalf of the state easily betrayed the professed ideals of the state.
–– Democracy and the rule of law ––