forces in Syria, and the Assyrians continued the assault on what was left of Mitanni
(cf. Hout 1994 ).
This opened the way for the Babylonian strike at Elam. Babylonia was thus free
to act: as long as the Egyptians and the Hittites maintained their fruitless conflict
in Syria, and the Assyrians continued their war of attrition against Mitanni. There
was a general stand-off, and the next few decades were dominated by diplomatic
squabbles related to dynastic intrigue. During his campaigns against Mitanni,
Shuppiluliuma had placed Shattiwaza, one of the sons of the murdered Tushratta on
the throne of Mitanni. Supporting him through marriage treaties and military support,
Shattiwaza had managed to re-establish Mitanni, more or less under Hittite tutelage.
This was necessarily a provocation for Assyria, but eventually he was able to free him-
self from Hittite hegemony and thus Assur-uballit of Assyria seems to have tolerated
the state for a while (cf. Wilhelm 1982 for details).
With the exception of a marginal detail, this story would not be relevant to our
narrative, but at one point Shattiwaza had turned up in Babylon seeking asylum
before securing Shuppiluliuma’s aid. Decades later, in Hatti, Hattushili III displaced
his nephew Urkhi-teshup as king, and the Hittite usurper achieved a rapprochement
with both Kadashman-Turgu of Babylon and Shalmaneser I of Assyria. A minor
diplomatic squabble almost became grounds for a major war when the deposed Hittite
king Urkhi-Teshup sought to escape from his exile, first seeking aid from Babylon,
but finally arriving at the Egyptian court, where he was welcomed by Ramesses II.
Being familiar with Shattiwaza’s personal history, and confronted with the facts on
the ground which had resulted from it (an independent Mitanni allied with Assyria
against Hatti), Hattushili demanded that Urkhi-Teshup be extradited. Ramesses II
refused and
Hattusil III prepared to mobilise his forces. When informed of this, Kadashman-
Turgu of Babylon promptly severed diplomatic relations with Egypt and offered
to send – even to lead – his troops against Egypt alongside Hattusil. This help
was courteously refused by the Hittite king.. ., but never had the international
storm clouds thickened more darkly in the world of the Ancient Near East.
(Kitchen 1982 : 74 )Thus, Babylon and Egypt stood on the verge of a direct conflict aroused by dynastic
difficulties in the Hittite royal household. Ironically, a century earlier, Babylon and
Egypt had enjoyed excellent relations precisely because there was no real potential
for direct conflict, and thus the Babylonian king Burnaburiash had unadvisedly prom-
ised continued peace to Amenophis III (Moran 1992 : 12 ). Unadvisedly, because, at
that time, the Egyptians apparently permitted Babylonian merchants to be murdered
and robbed in their domains (Moran 1992 : 16 – 17 ). However, in neither case did
actual conflict ensue. In the earlier case, it was probably because the root of the prob-
lem was not viewed as sufficiently serious, and in the later case because the situation
became even more serious.
In the event, Shalmaneser I of Assyria simply eliminated what was left of Mitanni
and incorporated it into the Assyrian empire, with the result that Hatti would soon
find itself facing the same Tukulti-Ninurta of Assyria who would also menace Babylon.
It is no surprise that the changing international situation allowed Ramesses II to pull
off a peace treaty with the Hittites despite the defeat at the battle of Qadesh.
— David A. Warburton —