- Chapter Thirty-Two -
tribes affected, the Bellovaci had, according to Diviciacus, fled to Britain after
Caesar's advance into north-east Gaul (n.14.2-5). This provided Caesar with a use-
ful pretext to present to the Senate the evidence that those tribes now in Britain had
been sending men and supplies to their distant relations (IV.20). There has even been
a suggestion that the presence of a large number of Gallic coins in Britain was sent
to pay for that help (Hawkes 1977: 142) though doubt has been expressed about this
(Muckelroy 1981: 275-97 ). Strabo (IV-4-1) stated that the Veneti were prepared to
attempt to hinder Caesar's projected campaign against Britain for fear of the loss of
their monopoly, a suggestion explored by C.E. Stevens (1982: 3-18).
For Caesar to gain control over the Channel, it was essential that the Veneti and
their fleet should be destroyed. The pretext for hostilities was the detention of the
Roman officers sent to collect corn. Caesar probably made the offence seem far
more serious by adding that they had been imprisoned (in vincla). Caesar had been
collecting and hiring ships for his invasion of Britain, but he had come to realize that
he could not compete seriously with the Veneti in the Channel. He began by attack-
ing their cliff castles on the edges of the promontories. But he soon discovered that
they were protected by the tides and they were also very difficult to approach by
land, a completely new factor for one accustomed to the Mediterranean. Caesar
describes in some detail the physical problems and also the type of ships used by the
tribe (III.q). The only way the Romans could hope to capture and destroy the
Venetic ships was by boarding them and he chronicles in detail the successful tactics
that followed. Caesar's treatment of the Veneti was especially savage: the whole of their
senate was put to the sword and all the able-bodied males sold into slavery. Thus the
Channel trade monopoly was broken by the virtual destruction of the tribal leaders.
THE INVASIONS OF BRITAIN
The first reconnaisance of Britain took place late in the season of 55 BC as Caesar
had first to deal with the Germans. Total ignorance of the neap tide almost led to
disaster (IV.23-38). This could be considered, therefore, as no more than a raid, and
the twenty days of thanksgiving decreed by the Senate must appear as an over-
reaction or the result of misinformation. Caesar may have regarded it as one of his
rare failures, to be rapidly expunged from the record. But he was more determined
than before to seize the rich financial rewards which he calculated were available for
the taking. He had been made aware of the difficulties of transporting a large army
across the Channel, but he had also discovered that the Britons were still using
war-chariots, long obsolete in Gaulish fighting practice. In the winter of 55-54 BC,
he ordered more extensive and thorough preparations, which included the gathering
together of 600 ships and building 28 men-of-war (V.2). After waiting twenty-five
days for fair weather, he set sail with his legions and 4,000 Gallic cavalry. The Britons
were so alarmed at the size of this armada that they withdrew from the coast; Caesar
stated that 800 ships could be seen altogether and if 628 were used by the army, this
leaves 172 hired or built by the traders (v.8; annontinis privatisque quas sui quisque
commodi Jecerat). One could have no clearer indication of Caesar's main intention,
that of continuing to loot and plunder in hostile terrain, all of which would be