megalopolis (PVL: 18 – 19 ; RPC: 66 – 8 ; Stein-Wilkeshuis 1991 : 43 – 5 ). These are the
nuts and bolts of a working document which both sides thought met their needs,
judging by the fact that the terms feature in comparable form in the Russo-Byzantine
treaty ratified a generation later. The 944 treaty to some extent fills in the gaps left
by the earlier texts and is slightly more forthcoming about the commodities in play:
besides ships’ cargoes and slaves, silk is mentioned and Rus are forbidden from buying
silks worth more than 50 solidi (PVL: 24 ; RPC: 75 ).
These treaties give an impression of joint-concern on the part of the Rus and imperial
leaderships with orderly commerce, involving constant exchanges over such matters as
restitution of the property of a Rus who has died intestate to kinsfolk in the north. That
correspondence went on between Rus and Byzantine officials is confirmed by finds of
earlier and mid-tenth-century seals at Kiev and Shestovitsa (Bulgakova 2004 : 49 – 51 ,
55 – 7 ). A picture of a militarised elite geared to trading with the south also emerges
from a text drafted for Constantine VII around 950. Chapter Nine of Constantine’s
De administrando imperio depicts the Rus as based on the Middle Dnieper, while also
occupying Smolensk and points north, and ‘all the Rus’ constitute an elite preoccupied
with tribute-collection and trade. The cycle of their ‘hard way of life’ revolves around
winter spent among Slav tribute-payers and then, ‘as the Dnieper ice melts’, they
reassemble in Kiev while simple craft made from newly felled trees are floated down-
stream to Kiev by Slavs who are paid for their labours. The boats are fitted out and laden,
and the Rus set forth in convoy as far as the Dnieper Rapids. Constantine’s account
of the journey derives from an eyewitness. The Rapids’ names are given ‘in Rus’ and ‘in
Slavic’, certain of the former being clearly identifiable as Old Norse, for example
Oulvorsi, a compound deriving from words for ‘island’ (hólmr) and ‘waterfall, rapid’ (fors)
(DAI: 58 – 9 ; Jenkins 1962 : 45 ). The Rus have to disembark with their goods at the
deadliest Rapid of all, helped by the fact that their foremost commodities, slaves, are
self-propelling. But the Pecheneg nomads try to attack them there and follow them
downstream, stalking them as far as the Danube delta: ‘and if it happens that the sea
casts a monoxylon to shore, they all put in to land, to present a united front against the
Pechenegs’ (DAI: 62 – 3 ).
The Rus’ journey appeared noteworthy to Byzantine observers, and their feats of
organisation, boatmanship and endurance can hardly be overstated. As Emperor
Constantine’s informant perceived, stragglers from the encumbered flotillas had few
prospects of survival and this might serve as a paradigm for the Rus presence on the
Middle Dnieper as a whole. Compared with the diverse nexuses that still brought
Muslim silver to the north in the first half of the tenth century and involved caravans of
camels, boatmen on the Upper Volga and countless small-scale fur-traders and trappers
(including part-time agriculturalists), the Byzantine connection was largely a matter
for those already disposing of resources, coercive and material. There may have been
more than one trading flotilla of container-craft each year and some Rus boats of the
more seaworthy kind could have made the journey solo or in small groups. But boats
and armaments were prerequisite for transporting valuables, and the essence of
profitable dealing lay in exaction of goods by means of tribute for minimal outlay and
in the collective security provided by a trading convoy. For these purposes, a fairly
tight form of politico-military organisation was indispensable, capable of intimidating
tribute-payers, guarding the convoys and enforcing the terms agreed with the
Byzantines.
–– Jonathan Shepard––