Enlightened self-interest weighed in favour of mutual cooperation among the
tribute-raisers, especially since both Constantine’s account and archaeological evidence
imply that Rus numbers on the Middle Dnieper were limited. Some Slav tribes, such as
the Derevlians, had effective hierarchies of their own, headed by a ‘prince’ (PVL: 27 ;
RPC: 78 – 9 ). The Rus had a corresponding need for ‘princes’ of their own, forming some
sort of hierarchy but jointly concerned with policing the exchanges with Byzantium.
This is, roughly speaking, the picture that Constantine VII’s writings and the Rus
Primary Chronicle disclose. Constantine’s address-formula provided for letters to ‘the
prince of Rho ̄sia’ (DC: 691 ) but other texts produced under his aegis mention ‘princes’
of the Rus (DC: 595 , 597 ; DAI: 62 – 3 ) in the plural and twenty-five persons were
substantial enough to send their own representatives to negotiate the 944 treaty with
Byzantium. The lengthy line-up, which includes a few Slavic names, suggests keen
interest in the Byzantine connection on the part of the elite and by around 940 , at latest,
the locus of political authority had shifted south: Igor (ON Ingi), the earliest indis-
putably historical paramount prince of the Rus, was based at Kiev while his infant
son, Sviatoslav, ‘sat’ in ‘Novgorod’, by the site of Gorodishche (DAI: 56 – 7 ). Igor was
probably styled kagan, and his relationship with his chief commander, Sveneld, has
overtones of Khazar-style dual rulership. But unlike the kagan described by Arabic
writers of earlier generations, Igor was himself a war-leader, conducting tribute-rounds
and commanding a major expedition in 941. Such personal activity is what might be
expected by way of response to all the challenges facing the Rus on the Dnieper.
What one would not expect, from the scenario pictured, is that Byzantium would
be the target of Igor’s expedition. The Byzantines themselves were taken by surprise
and the emperor is said by Liudprand of Cremona to have spent ‘sleepless nights’
(Chiesa 1998 : 131 ) pondering what to do when a large war fleet appeared in June 941.
The Rus ravaged along the Bosporos, paying special attention to churches, which
they burnt, and also to priests, through whose heads iron nails were driven (Bekker
1838 : 425 ). But they could not penetrate well-fortified Byzantine towns and their low-
slung boats were no match for the elderly vessels that were brought out of mothballs and
rigged out with Greek Fire (Chiesa 1998 : 132 ). The expedition was, for the Rus, a
disaster, for all their courage and ingenuity. In fact the episode probably reflects the
Dnieper Rus’ vulnerability to pressures from external powers. According to a Khazar
text, the Rus leadership had been induced by the Byzantine emperor ‘with great
presents’ to seize the main Khazar fortress on the Straits of Kerch. The paramount prince
complied, gained control of the fortress but was subsequently driven out; the defeated
Rus then had reluctantly to accept the Khazars’ demand that they mount an expedition
against Constantinople and this Khazar text, like Liudprand’s account, makes Greek
Fire the chief instrument of the Rus’ destruction (Golb and Pritsak 1982 : 118 – 19 ). The
episode suggests that the Rus were amenable to Byzantine wishes because of their need
for access to the markets of Constantinople, while still ultimately inferior to the Khazars
in the steppes. In fact they were soon seeking renewal of their trading privileges, which
were confirmed with some elaborations and restrictions in the 944 treaty. Byzantine
apprehensions are registered in new clauses such as the ban on Rus from wintering in the
Dnieper estuary. Constantine VII’s account of the Rus trading organisation, compiled
soon after the war, presupposes that their leadership had a strong stake in maintaining
the sea-link, even while it emphasises the need to woo the Pechenegs as allies, to
forestall any further attack on ‘this imperial city of the Romans’ (DAI: 50 – 1 ).
–– chapter 37 : The Viking Rus and Byzantium––