104 RALF AHRENS AND ANDRÉ STEINER
the controlled economy of the Nazi era and as an answer to the failure of
the capitalist system during the Great Depression. It was also supposed
to be part of the bulwark set up to stop the spread of communism. That
said, however, the more the GDR’s economic performance and standard
of living lagged behind that of the FRG from the late 1950s onward, the
less its system seemed to represent a viable economic alternative.
The foundation for the West German “Economic Miracle” with its sta-
ble growth not only lay in the emergence of mass consumerism in con-
junction with increased income; rather, elements of the general economic
framework, such as the new social partnership between capital and work,
the gradual liberalization of foreign economic policy, or the fi rst steps to-
ward western European economic integration, also played a crucial role.
In addition, this growth rested on the surplus of well-trained human cap-
ital, augmented by immigration from East Germany before 1961, which
was very much a drain on the GDR economy. The ability of West German
companies to quickly consolidate their export markets within the unusu-
ally rapidly expanding global economy also contributed to this economic
boom. Moreover, the above-average percentage of the capital goods in-
dustry within the production structure proved to be benefi cial because
the respective products were quite in demand on the domestic as well as
foreign markets. Likewise, recovery investments bolstered growth quan-
titatively and qualitatively to a signifi cant degree.^6 At the same time, an
unprecedented upswing in productivity swept over the agricultural sec-
tor, which also helped pave the way for mass consumption.^7
The GDR could not keep up with this predominantly demand-based
growth in the Federal Republic. The diff erent shortcomings and defects
associated with the way in which a classic planned economy functioned
became more and more apparent as a result. Moreover, consumption lev-
els continued to fall behind in light of the reparations that still had to
be paid to the USSR and the reliance of SED industrial policies on the
capital goods industry in keeping with Marxist theory and Stalinist indus-
trialization policies; the uprising on 17 June 1953 did little to change the
reality of this situation.^8 In order to generate stronger productivity-driven
growth following the building of the Wall in 1961, which suppressed mi-
gration to the West and changed the general economic framework, the
SED leadership introduced an economic reform. As part of this restruc-
turing, more indirect and monetary-based instruments were supposed to
be used to manage the economy in order to ensure more innovation and
thereby increase the effi ciency of the entire economy.^9 Concurrently, in
response to the fi rst economic crisis in 1966/67 following the “miracle
years,” the West German government sought to increase its interventions
in the economy through what was referred to as “global management”