ECONOMIC CRISES, STRUCTURAL CHANGE 105
(Globalsteuerung) in the Federal Republic. A planning euphoria took hold
in other parts of society as well, which was a manifestation of technocratic
fantasies, but these measures had little in common with the Soviet-style
mechanisms of a planned economy.^10 Such apparent parallels formed the
basis of convergence theories that sprouted in the West at the end of the
1960s espousing the idea that the competing systems would move closer
together as they faced similar industrial and social challenges. However,
proponents of these theories often overlooked the fact that neither the
West nor the East intended to alter their tenets of property ownership.
Nevertheless, by introducing reforms and raising its investment quota,
the GDR was able to temporarily improve its economic situation, which
also fostered consumption. After the rather austere years of the 1950s,
the standard of living in the GDR improved considerably as a result. While
the supply of foodstuff s stabilized and the range of available products ex-
panded to an extent, the number of technical consumer goods in house-
holds multiplied, although their quality and number still lagged behind
compared to West Germany. Regardless, the 1960s seemed to mark the
“golden years” for many GDR citizens, thanks not only to the improving
standard of living and steady growth rates, but also the temporary tenor
of candor that emerged in the discussions about economic and social
problems within the context of the economic reforms.^11
Both of these models for economic growth faced massive crises around
1970, but the causes behind them came from very diff erent directions.
Toward the end of the 1960s, the SED leadership had launched a growth
and technology off ensive, concentrating its investments in those branches
of the industry considered to be modern while neglecting suppliers and
energy producers. As it had become clear that the GDR lagged behind,
this strategy was supposed to accelerate structural change in order to fi -
nally “overtake without catching up” to the West, as the SED party leader
Walter Ulbricht put it.^12 Similar attempts to boost economic development
were made several times throughout the history of the GDR as part of the
country’s eff orts to demonstrate the advantages of its economic system.
Yet, each time, the faults inherent in the system of a planned economy
clashed with the lofty goals of SED leaders, which far exceeded the po-
tential of East Germany’s economy. Combined with the inconsistency of
previous economic reforms, these overblown growth policies led to an-
other economic crisis, ultimately loosening Walter Ulbricht’s hold on the
SED while opening the door for Erich Honecker. Faced with the unrest
in Poland in December 1970 as well as the increasing number of strikes
in the GDR, Honecker then changed the tone of the country’s economic
policy. As in other Soviet bloc countries, the hope was that a boom in
consumption, as well as improved social policies, would increase the