106 RALF AHRENS AND ANDRÉ STEINER
motivation to work, thereby establishing the foundation for better produc-
tivity. Simultaneously, a “shift from a growth-based paradigm of progress
to a security-based paradigm of consolidation” was introduced in order
to ensure domestic peace and uphold the SED’s monopoly on power.^13
But, these policies also bore new risks. Signifi cant extra costs burdened
the GDR economy, especially between 1971 and 1976, and investments
in new technologies were neglected as a result.^14 Even the explosion in
prices for petroleum and other raw materials that hit the markets glob-
ally, which will be addressed later in this chapter, did not deter the SED
leadership from its course. At fi rst, the leaders of the GDR dismissed the
international currency fl uctuations and the collapse of the Bretton Woods
global monetary system as a capitalist phenomenon that had little to do
with their own economy; in the beginning they also ignored the growing
debts owed to the West for political reasons.^15 In reality, these new debts
signaled that the East German economic policies adopted since the early
1970s had heavily burdened the national economy.
Additionally, the SED leadership responded to the growth crisis at the
end of the 1960s by backpedaling on its economic reforms and reintro-
ducing “classic” steering mechanisms typical of a planned economy. This
move was supposed to address the insecurities that had emerged as a
result of the reforms and regain trust by returning to old institutions. Yet,
this process increased centralism and dirigisme, thereby exacerbating all
too familiar ineffi ciencies within the system while giving less priority to
structural changes and innovation. Given these circumstances, targeted
attempts to boost the development of microelectronics were only able to
achieve rather unsatisfactory results later on. These failed eff orts were
mirrored by the dwindling strength of the Utopian hopes and visionary
aspects of the socialist project. Combined with the progressive loss of
substance and the deteriorating global economic situation, these fac-
tors steered economic policy in both the GDR and the FRG toward crisis
management, although some measures were done just for the sake of
it.^16 By the end of the 1970s at the latest, the trust of offi cial elites and
the population at large in the potential and the structures of the planned
economy—to the extent that it still existed—had thus crumbled or disap-
peared entirely.^17
In light of these developments and the crisis that then ensued in 1971,
growth in the GDR took a nosedive once again in 1976 and 1982 before
entering a fi nal stage of steady decline in 1986. That said, however, it
must be noted that it is more diffi cult to assess growth in East Germany
than in West Germany due to the lack of suffi cient data. Nonetheless,
it can safely be said that East Germany’s growth rates continually sank
after the 1950s; they recovered slightly in the fi rst half of the 1970s, but