110 RALF AHRENS AND ANDRÉ STEINER
period and World War II had generated the rapid growth of the Golden
Age, which was exhausted over time. As a result, supply conditions de-
teriorated, and it became increasingly diffi cult to ensure technological
progress. Moreover, the rise in real capital intensity decreased the mar-
ginal productivity of capital. This meant that the returns generated by the
same investment quota kept decreasing. Although the prices of primary
goods had risen only slowly during the boom years at fi rst, this exorbitant
growth ultimately pushed up the prices for raw materials. That said, the
rise of some Asian economies not only intensifi ed competitive pressure in
developed industrial countries, but also drove up prices even before the
oil price shock that hit in 1973.^31 These processes appeared in a similar
form in the GDR, even though they were systemically transmitted in a
diff erent way. Despite slight improvements in the 1960s, East Germany
was plagued over the long-term by waning investment effi ciency stem-
ming from the depletion of its reconstruction potential and rising capital
intensity. The information and management problems associated with
the planned economy further intensifi ed these eff ects, as did the lack of
interest in profi ts among the enterprises, as well as the fragmentation of
the funds and resources used and the insuffi cient focus on economic cri-
teria. Likewise, the low level of labor mobility due to the full employment
guarantee also played a role.^32
All told, both blocs experienced an analogous decrease in growth that
was spurred on by cross-system factors, although the causal relationships
between these factors varied by system. However, the stalled growth that
hit the East a little bit later than the West was part of a lethal process de-
veloping behind the Iron Curtain.^33 Within this context, structural change
proved to be a signifi cant factor, which will be discussed in more detail
in the next section.
Structural Change and Its Origins
In his infl uential book Das technologische Patt, which was published in
the mid-1970s, the West German scholar of innovation Gerhard Mensch
located the core of the crisis “in the drift of structural change.” He argued
that this transformation unleashed identity crises among the population
that were based on fear and hope alike—fear of losing familiar ways of work
and life, but hope in the new activities and perspectives that might result
from innovation.^34 The continuous changes aff ecting economic structures
were and remain a by-product of the industrial capitalist system. Yet, this
transformation varies in its intensity at diff erent points in time. Likewise,
the actors involved, as well as the general public, often have diff erent per-