ECONOMIC CRISES, STRUCTURAL CHANGE 117
digm of industrialization until the bitter end. Simultaneously, an eye was
always kept on the West in order to be able to follow some of its devel-
opments and avoid falling behind completely. The decisive factor infl u-
encing the GDR leadership in its decision on whether structural change
was supposed to progress or rather be taken down a notch was whether
or not it would undermine full employment. This consideration tended
to block the transformation, and, ultimately, some of its unintended mid-
range consequences were the erosion of the basis of full employment
and, along with it, the collapse of state socialism. Structural change was
likewise approached from a labor market perspective among policy mak-
ers in the West, especially given that full employment was also an essen-
tial aim of economic policy decisions, although it was never guaranteed
(economically) by the state. Consequently, agrarian and industrial poli-
cies in the West were often driven by social policy goals and were not
necessarily part of a conscious eff ort to boost the economy.^52 The costs
and possibilities associated with such a policy line also factored into the
decision-making process.
Economic structural change in the East and West were therefore only
connected through the rivalry between the two systems. As this played a
much greater role in the GDR during the period in question, the dynam-
ics of this interaction were thus asymmetrical. Against its own claims
of having created an alternative system, the GDR sought to reproduce
the technological developments and consumption trends of the West, but
was never able to reach the same qualitative or quantitative niveau. At
the same time, however, both sides in this race to get ahead had to face
increasing competition within international markets.
Foreign Trade, Economic Integration,
and German-German Relations
A look at East and West German foreign trade relations perhaps most
clearly reveals the tensions between demarcation and entanglement
within the two German economies. This was particularly true regarding
integration in the European Communities (EC) in the West and the Coun-
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in the East. According
to estimates, about half of the industrial production coming from the ter-
ritory of what would become the GDR and almost a fourth of the produc-
tion in West Germany was shipped to other parts of the Reich in 1936;
the corresponding ratios for imports were similar.^53 In contrast, by the
end of the 1950s, so-called inter-German trade accounted for about 2.5
percent of the FRG’s cross-border exchange of goods, although it was