130 RALF AHRENS AND ANDRÉ STEINER
shock waves released by the need to adjust to new competition. Thus, the
economic and social upheavals in the 1990s were fi rst and foremost the
result of GDR economic policy. Additionally, they stemmed from avoid-
able and unavoidable political errors made after 1990, as well as accel-
erated globalization in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet bloc. But
methodological constraints make it diffi cult to separate these factors and
specify their diff erent implications.^104
At the same time, the share of industry in overall employment dipped
quite quickly in West Germany in the 1990s. Among other things, the real
appreciation of the D-Mark after the reunifi cation boom handicapped in-
dustry and facilitated an increase in the share of the service sector, which
was akin to what happened in the mid-1970s.^105 Yet it has been apparent
for some time that self-suffi cient economic development in East Germany
would not come about without functioning industrial companies. In any
case, the prognoses regarding the transition of the Federal Republic to a
service society did not hold up. Although industrial production is becom-
ing more and more intertwined with the service sector, the persistence
of industry and especially the insistence on its “modernity” since the
economic and fi nancial crisis in 2008/09 have fundamentally called into
question the idea of a “post-industrial society.”^106
Although to a lesser degree than before, both the old and new fed-
eral states are still shaped by industrial structures (and their accompa-
nying institutions such as trade unions), which had been suff ering under
pressure to adapt to the changing global situation since the 1960s. The
ensuing upheavals not only bolstered the entanglements between the
two Germanies, but also often intensifi ed demarcation eff orts on both
sides. As part of the post-1989 transformation, the East Germans fought
to achieve the consumption level of the West symbolized by the D-Mark,
and to adopt the institutions and structures of the West German social
market economy. Although it was very much a game of catch-up, the
East was able to make huge jumps forward in prosperity and affl uence.
Yet a considerable portion of the population had to stand by and watch
as their professional qualifi cations and skills lost value over the course of
the massive restructuring of the economy.
Ultimately, this was one of the consequences of the inability of the
East German planned economy to react adequately and fl exibly to the
new cross-system challenges that played an obvious role in the coun-
try’s downfall in the 1980s. In contrast, the West German system, with its
market-based economy, was actually able to adjust well enough to these
changes in order to bring about a new upturn in the 1980s. Nonetheless,
it was also plagued by structural and institutional problems aff ecting its
ability to react to economic structural change and demographic shifts