192 WINFRIED SÜß
man reunifi cation treaties.^3 In the negotiations, however, the structure of
social security proved to be a major bone of contention because it was
intrinsically related to the larger confl ict over how much of the old GDR
system should become part of unifi ed Germany. Simultaneously, though,
the welfare state was an important mental link between the two German
societies, especially during the diffi cult early phase of reunifi cation. Al-
though the divergent conceptions of a welfare state that had emerged
on each side of the Wall were tainted by the system-specifi c attributes of
each state, both German societies believed that social policy was the way
to address social problems. Ultimately, it was also social security institu-
tions that had to absorb some of the social shock waves unleashed by the
reunifi cation process.
In its guise as a key anti-crisis mechanism, the welfare state was thus
called upon for a third time in twentieth-century German history to deal
with the social consequences of the transformation of a political system
(after 1918 and after 1945). Yet the social cushioning of this particular
transformation was unprecedented in history because of the antagonistic
relationship between the two German states in the system rivalry of the
Cold War, the need to deal with the economic and social legacy left behind
in the wake of a run-down socialist state, and the way in which German
reunifi cation was embedded within global economic transformations.
The promise that standards of life would be equalized across all of Ger-
many as quickly as possible was certainly one of the mainstays of political
rhetoric during the Wende. But, as recent studies in social science have
pointed out, this goal has yet to become a reality, although it must be said
that substantial progress has been made in the twenty-fi ve years since
reunifi cation. As of 2009, households in the new federal states were less
than half as wealthy on average than those in the West. Likewise, in spite
of trends toward more equal wages and salaries, East Germans were still
earning a fi fth less than West Germans. Even today, people living in the
former East face a greater risk of unemployment and poverty.^4 Moreover,
if normative attitudes are taken into account, two quite distinct subsociet-
ies still seem to exist that diff er in terms of their living standards and the
persistence of inequalities, as well as in their respective notions of jus-
tice, expectations vis-à-vis the welfare state, and attitudes toward social
inequality. In general, former citizens of East Germany expect more from
the welfare state and possess a heightened sense of social polarization,
but they are also more committed to equalization.^5
Yet there is another side to the history of sociopolitical integration in
reunifi ed Germany. When it comes to key aspects of welfare, such as life
expectancy, for example, the diff erences between East and West have
largely been overcome. In 1990, life expectancy among men diff ered by