212 WINFRIED SÜß
One of the prices that people paid for this security in the GDR was a
lack of professional development opportunities. Whereas the chances for
upward professional mobility were comparably open in West Germany,
people born after 1960 in the GDR did not have nearly as many career ad-
vancement chances. After the initial phase in which socialism was estab-
lished in the GDR, many of the more prominent positions were occupied
by relatives of the founding generation, who acquired positions of lead-
ership at a relatively young age and held on to them until they were quite
old. Accordingly, this increased the signifi cance of political loyalty for pro-
fessional careers. When the GDR was fi rst getting started, membership in
the SED was one way to compensate for other defi cits in job qualifi cations,
such as a lack of the appropriate degrees. For the age cohorts that came
later, party affi liation became a necessary prerequisite for any kind of ca-
reer development; since there were fewer career options, upward mobility
in the GDR was beset with increasing pressure to become politicized.^51
Although the SED leadership never gave up on its intention to grant
privileges to the children of workers and peasants, and the uniform so-
cialist state schools proclaimed to guarantee equal educational opportu-
nities for all children regardless of their backgrounds, family resources
continued to play a role in gaining access to the upper levels of education.
In fact, they even sometimes seemed to be more important than ever be-
fore. Consequently, the rate of self-recruitment among the academically
educated civil service was on the rise. While in the 1960s and 1970s the
sons within this class had a three-times-higher chance of belonging to the
civil service themselves than the sons of workers, the chances for the age
cohorts born after 1960 increased by a factor of seven to eight. This meant
that the chances for children of workers to acquire a higher level of educa-
tion by attending university in the GDR were worse than in West Germany.
Of course, the income hierarchy was not only determined by education.
A variety of political criteria, such as the function of certain professions
in the apparatus of rule, were also quite decisive. The tip of this hierar-
chy was occupied by the predominantly male members of the apparatus
of dictatorial power, while employees outside of production and retirees
were relegated to the bottom.^52 Thanks to the relatively homogeneous in-
come structure and limited consumption opportunities, the material dif-
ferences in East Germany were less pronounced than in West Germany.
In particular, the gap between mid-level incomes and the highest income
brackets was much smaller than in the Federal Republic. Furthermore,
the high subsidies for rents and basic necessities in the GDR cushioned
the eff ects of low income on social stratifi cation. However, almost a third
of the GDR population, and especially retirees, were entirely dependent
on these artifi cially cheaper everyday items.^53