SOCIAL SECURITY, SOCIAL INEQUALITY 215
integrated into the reunifi cation process; they were pushed back for the
time being, only to be taken up again a decade later under more diffi cult
circumstances. This vote in favor of the transfer of welfare state institu-
tions was also a vote against keeping the sociopolitical traditions of the
GDR, which proved to be a very controversial point. Indeed, it touched on
the question of which elements of the GDR’s sociopolitical identity would
be brought into a reunifi ed Germany. In particular, the right to work and
the well-functioning system of childcare in the GDR had a high symbolic
value within this context. Ultimately, only a portion of the GDR’s achieve-
ments in terms of equality with respect to the employment of women
with children were taken over after reunifi cation. The notion that the GDR
was a model society and point of reference when it came to this issue
continued to hold sway, especially since it was easier to reconcile with
cross-European trends than the strong male breadwinner model that had
determined the path of the old West Germany.
When the decision was made in favor of the social union, however,
the costs associated with this process were greatly underestimated. One
point that was particularly problematic had to do with a third fundamental
decision that was made, namely to fi nance reunifi cation primarily through
the coff ers of the social security system. Even then, critics questioned this
method of fi nancing because it essentially meant that the costs of German
unity would be covered by the contributions paid by those insured in the
system. Business owners, independent professionals, and civil servants,
on the other hand, were largely exempt from paying into this system,
which meant that the fi nancial burden of German unity was dispropor-
tionately put on the shoulders of the lower and middle income brackets.
Unlike the West German laws that off set such fi nancial burdens in 1949
and 1952 (Lastenausgleich), there were hardly any measures introduced
in 1990 that required wealthy individuals to make special contributions to
fi nance reunifi cation. In contrast to the way that West Germany had dealt
with the victims of war and expellees, preexisting patterns of inequality
were actually strengthened after 1990 because of various regulations,
such as the priority given to the natural restitution of factories and prop-
erty to old owners without instituting a property levy.^57 The problematic
strain that the costs of reunifi cation put on the social security system,
given the increased cost of labor, was not a necessary consequence of
German unity; rather, it was the result of a fi nancing model that had been
chosen for extrinsic reasons. The expectation was that it would be easier
in a political sense to increase social security contributions as opposed
to taxes.^58
Despite these issues, however, the share of the German welfare state
in the success of the reunifi cation process was quite remarkable. The