TRANSFORMATIONS IN WORK 249
model, is a fully automated factory staff ed entirely by robots. Indeed, this
tendency toward self-abrogation, or rather calculated obsolescence, is
inherent within the Fordist model of production.
In turn, the dynamic unleashed by Fordism within individual plants
exerts an enormous amount of infl uence on the structures of the work-
force. When true to the model, skilled workers would fuse together into a
small stratum at the outset. Their vocational profi les and assigned tasks
would also change fundamentally, shifting more toward the setting up
and surveillance of Fordist assembly lines. The majority of the production
workers on the line would then (ideally) be trained for a short time. The
proportion of skilled (supervisory) workers would then increase, while
that of “simple workers” on the assembly line would shrink in accordance
with the level of automation and perfection of the assembly line process.
This general process was very much at work in West Germany as well as
in other highly industrialized Western countries from the 1960s onward.
There were other elements that extended beyond the level of an indi-
vidual factory that could be classifi ed as “Fordist.” Mass consumption,
which rested on the three pillars of mass production, higher incomes, and
mass distribution, as well as technological innovation—all of which made
it possible to turn more and more luxury goods into mass products—was
just one such aspect. The eight-hour day and the clear distinction between
work and leisure time was a second element, while relatively long-term
and secure employment was a third. Lastly, the idea of a “work-life bal-
ance,” in which the center of life shifted toward leisure time and vacation,
could also be considered a “Fordist” trend. Furthermore, specifi c types
of corporate organization and culture, especially strong external control
over employees and well-defi ned vertical integration, also fell under this
rubric, as did the tendency toward so-called corporate self-suffi ciency.
Global developments, however, have increasingly called the “Fordist”
model into question since the mid-1970s. Japan’s “economic miracle,”
for example, put a great deal of economic pressure on Western Europe.
In particular, all eyes turned toward the major automaker Toyota, which
had been developing a (seemingly) new production scheme since the be-
ginning of the 1950s. Toyota quickly became the new act to follow. A key
element of “Toyotism” is the just-in-time principle. It rests on the idea
that the exact number of the right parts for each step in the production
process is ready to go exactly when they are needed. The just-in-time
principle also necessitates to the retraining of those workers (still) em-
ployed on the assembly line so that they can resolve any standstills re-
sulting from production hold-ups or defects in machinery; workers also
need to be able to operate diff erent machines in order to be able to keep