350 JÜRGEN DANYEL AND ANNETTE SCHUHMANN
solutions within the COMECON, but limited production capacities and
diff ering levels of development in microelectronics detracted from the
feasibility of these initiatives.^2
Furthermore, the highly subsidized welfare system and promises of
full employment in the GDR could not really be sacrifi ced in the name of
computerization with the goal of rationalization. Well up the party ladder,
offi cials were well aware of just how ruinous this stance might be in the
long run. Moreover, rationalization and intensifi cation had already be-
come the new mantra of the SED’s economic policy, although there was
never any intention to give up on the idea of full employment.
Both German states certainly kept a close watch on one another until
the collapse of the GDR, although East Germany undoubtedly kept better
track of computerization developments in West Germany than vice versa.
This essay looks specifi cally at the extent to which the special economic
and fi nancial policy relationship between the two Germanys off ered a lim-
ited framework for ties that ran back and forth across the Wall in the area
of computerization. New entanglements and dependencies, for example,
also emerged in the gray areas of illegal technology transfers and industrial
espionage. Although the East sought to use such methods to overcome its
defi cits, this only increased its dependence on the West in the end.
Technology was nevertheless one of the most important areas in which
both sides kept tabs on each other from the very beginning. Well into the
1970s, however, only a limited number of experts within the fi eld who
were “in the know” could actually see that the West was outperforming
the East in IT and computer technology. This changed as the computer
became a device that could be used by mainstream individuals, making it
a prime consumer good. By the mid-1980s, a large portion of West Ger-
man society had come to realize that computers were very likely the tech-
nology of the future because they had used them at work or in their free
time. At the same time, computer performance could be experienced and
measured, which made it easier to draw comparisons between East and
West. As in other fi elds of consumption, the media and advertising played
an important cross-border role when it came to the evolution of com-
puters as a consumer good. In addition, a growing number of economic
experts, researchers, technicians, and private people had been able to
see for themselves what the state of technology was like in both East and
West Germany thanks to more opportunities for travel and interaction.
These entanglements were also marked by the asymmetries so typical of
the relationship between East and West. By the 1970s and 1980s, com-
puterization in the societies governed by state socialism had long since
ceased to represent any kind of competition for the West. When it came
to technological advancements, West Germany had its gaze fi rmly affi xed