356 JÜRGEN DANYEL AND ANNETTE SCHUHMANN
As computerization progressed, the discourses in East and West were
preoccupied with the goal of achieving perfected production workfl ows
that were free of disruptions. In fact, the introduction of computer tech-
nology was actually celebrated in both blocs with arguments about the
“humanization of work,” sometimes with reference to the same theorists
such as Marx or Bernal.
This wave of technological information also wormed its way into the-
ories of postindustrial society and ideologically tinged political com-
mentaries, such as those propagated by Herman Kahn at the right-wing
conservative Hudson Institute from the 1960s onward. Predictions of the
future ranging in tone from euphoric to alarmist also emerged across the
political spectrum.^20 In West Germany, for example, the futurologist and
cyberneticist Karl Steinbuch admonished that the neglect of the natural
sciences would threaten the chances of being able to keep up with the de-
velopment of newer technologies.^21 In the early 1970s, some critics also
pointed to the “costs” that a society would have to pay for concentrating
on the development and use of advanced technologies.^22
Cautionary voices that spoke of a “technological gap” or warned that
the potential of advanced technologies might not be exhausted were also
heard in the GDR. By the early 1970s, during the Ulbricht era, experts
noticed that the GDR was falling behind in electronic data processing.
Apparently, a great uncertainty still plagued the question of how and to
what extent this new technology had to be dealt with in the GDR at the
beginning of the 1970s. Although the political leadership agreed on the
importance of the electronics industry for its program of forced rational-
ization, there were no eff orts specifi cally designed to support the micro-
electronics industry to speak of around 1970.^23
Representatives of the politburo fi rst addressed this issue more con-
cretely at the congress of the Central Committee in September 1976.
They estimated that the state of technology in the GDR lagged about four
years (analog circuits) to nine years (microprocessors) behind that of the
West. At the same time, it was clear that this gap could not be closed over
the next few years, so they also discussed the possibilities for counter
trades and license agreements, which had already been done in other
states in the Communist bloc.^24 The Communist power elite, especially
in the Soviet Union, was very well aware of the fact that technological
progress would decide the outcome of the rivalry between the systems.
Outside the boundaries of the Cold War confrontation, feature articles
published at the time fueled fears that other countries were pulling ahead
in technology, pointing at the Americans, alternating with the Soviets
(Sputnik shock), then the Japanese (automobile industry, consumer elec-
tronics, ship building), the South East Asians (communications technol-