508 JUTTA BRAUN
the political raison d’état of the West German government. Differences of
opinion not only cropped up in terms of the notorious Olympic boycotts,
but also in the run-up to the European soccer championships in 1988. In
both cases, the West German sports associations found themselves being
pressured by the West German government to conform to a political line.
A similar cleft between bloc politics and the interests of the GDR’s sports
leadership also emerged in the late 1980s in the GDR, albeit under en-
tirely diff erent political circumstances.
The decision to boycott the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow in
1980, for example, is considered to be one of the greatest crises in West
German sport. In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S.
President Jimmy Carter had issued an ultimatum on 20 January 1980 de-
manding that the Soviets withdraw their troops. His statement was cou-
pled with the threat to either cancel or move the Olympic Games. The
publicity attached to the Olympics was used to turn sports into a political
symbol, even though the federal government refused to go along with the
stronger economic boycott because it endangered the country’s export
interests. At this point in time, moreover, Olympic history was already rife
with boycotts or the threat thereof,^38 and it was by no means the fi rst time
that Cold War power plays had been involved. But, it was the fi rst time that
the West German government played a key role in a boycott situation.^39
The discussion that fl ared up in the following months and peaked in
April and May 1980 had a broad international scope: in numerous states,
especially in Western Europe, there was a tug-of-war between the gov-
ernments and the respective national Olympic committees, only the latter
of which were legally entitled to decide about their country’s participa-
tion in the Games.^40 Despite considerable reservations, Federal Chancel-
lor Helmut Schmidt fi nally declared himself in favor of a boycott in order
to demonstrate his loyalty to the country’s American ally. The recom-
mendation of the federal government to refrain from participating in the
Moscow Games was reinforced by a similar suggestion that was passed
by an overwhelming majority in the German Bundestag on 23 April 1980.
The head of the West German National Olympic Committee (NOC), Willi
Daume, had opposed the boycott, but he ultimately capitulated in the face
of this political front, about which he wrote, “What ultimately swayed the
members of our committee was the vote of the German Bundestag, which
pitted the weight (so to speak) of an entire grand coalition against our
small committee.”^41 In two face-to-face meetings in April 1980, Chancel-
lor Helmut Schmidt had also tried to convince the representatives of the
sports organizations to follow his lead. Schmidt left no doubt as to his
expectations: as records of these conversations indicate, he stressed the
importance of the fact “that sports in our country are not subject to the