48 FRANK BÖSCH AND JENS GIESEKE
teractions, primarily through the establishment of “permanent missions”
(instead of embassies), and it set up the framework for later agreements
and treaties.^7 All this was only made possible through the involvement of
the respective alliance partners, and especially through the rapproche-
ment between Bonn and Moscow. Undoubtedly, one of the most posi-
tive eff ects of these talks was the growing sense on both sides that they
could count upon what had been agreed. Through this process, even SED
emissaries such as Wolfgang Vogel, Hermann von Berg, or Alexander
Schalck-Golodkowski became signifi cant players. This political exchange
also survived new Cold War confrontations sparked by incidents such
as the NATO Double-Track Decision and the Soviet march into Afghani-
stan in 1979, as well as Helmut Kohl’s election as chancellor—given the
fact that his party had traditionally opposed Ostpolitik. Although this ex-
change was undoubtedly used by the GDR in its eff orts to gain formal in-
ternational recognition by other states, it defi nitely went beyond a merely
symbolic level. Despite rather cool overtones at times, these talks none-
theless led to concrete agreements. Even the Social Democratic Party
(SPD) continued its dialog with the SED after becoming the opposition
party, which ultimately resulted in a joint paper in 1987 titled “Confl icting
Ideologies and Common Security.”^8
Although the exchange via these dialogs increased, rapprochement
was by no means a linear process. When the FRG denied Honecker’s de-
mands that it recognize GDR citizenship, accept East German embassies,
agree to the Elbe as the offi cial border between East and West Germany,
and close down the registration offi ce in Salzgitter, the GDR reacted in-
dignantly by raising the minimum obligatory currency exchange amount
for travelers to the West. In turn, Honecker also faced increased pressure
from a “Moscow Faction” in the Politburo that had cautioned against rap-
prochement with the FRG.^9 Likewise, diplomatic talks were often plagued
by quite frosty moments, such as when Helmet Kohl clearly made a plea
for human rights and the right of self-determination in his toast on the oc-
casion of Honecker’s visit in 1987.^10 Nonetheless, the fundamental politi-
cal trust on both sides remained intact, paving the way for the billion-mark
loans as well as more offi cial visits, which ultimately fostered political ex-
changes and transfers within society. Even Brandt’s Ostpolitik raised polit-
ical hopes and sparked an interest in politics among many in the GDR. But
above all, this exchange carved out more space for the political opposition
and those wishing to leave East Germany to express their opinions, even
though the ever-expanding Stasi heightened its surveillance in return.
However, this increased political exchange cannot be attributed sim-
ply to the willingness of individual political actors to engage in such di-
alogs or to the economic crises that hit the GDR. Rather, rapprochement