POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS 53
These basic politicization and depoliticization processes in the GDR
featured a diff erent dynamic, but they were nonetheless tightly in sync
with the West. Yet there were no student riots akin to those in the West,
for example, because demonstrated loyalty and conformity to the party
regime were virtually indispensable for attaining high school diplomas
and university degrees.^30 Furthermore, the seven universities in the GDR
also lacked any kind of forum for a socially critical understanding of ac-
ademics and politics.^31 As a result, the universities were by no means a
hotbed of protest, not even in 1989.
According to the impressions of West Germans who visited the GDR,
which were systematically assessed by Infratest, only a minority of 30 to
40 percent of GDR residents were interested in politics. This fi gure also
included a gender gap of 10 to 20 percent between men and women.^32
Political interest reached a zenith of sorts in the early 1970s, when the
largest percentage of the population basically seemed to be positively
inclined toward the system and the approval rating peaked among the
youth who were striving for upward mobility. However, this favorable at-
titude was coupled with expectations of further material improvements
and political liberalization. At the same time, though, there was also
strong interest in Bonn’s new course of Ostpolitik, as well as the results
of German-German negotiations that existed well beyond these circles.
Nonetheless, a decided downturn took place in these areas after
1974/75 in the GDR when Honecker swiftly tightened the political reins
once again (for example, in the aff air surrounding Plenzdorf’s play Die
neue Leiden des jungen W.). In terms of consumption and social policy,
the mood shifted around 1976/77 as it became clear that Honecker’s as-
pirations for the “main task” of “further improving the material and cul-
tural standard of living of the people” in 1972 were nothing but illusions.
The skeptical reactions to the Ninth Party Congress and the coff ee supply
crisis, as well as the general resentment against the upgrading of the In-
tershops, for instance, all pointed to a turn in the tide. In 1977, the Stasi
spoke of an “increasing trend towards dissatisfaction.” It reported that
“some skeptical, pessimistic and negative opinions and even aggressive
arguments” were circulating.^33 The high hopes that German-German ne-
gotiations would bring further benefi ts for GDR citizens in fact dissipated
after the signing of the Basic Treaty and Brandt’s resignation in 1974. At
the same time, Ostpolitik had swept away ways of thinking about the two
Germanys as part of one whole and dashed the prospects for policy revi-
sions that would aff ect former refugees from Eastern territories.
According to the fi ndings of the secret popular opinion assessments
carried out on both sides of the Berlin Wall, this constellation remained
relatively stable until about 1985. During this decade, the underlying dis-