62 FRANK BÖSCH AND JENS GIESEKE
fi nes of the SED regime. Nonetheless, it can still be said that the SED had
to become more responsive under Honecker. It was forced to react not
only by the more direct West German television coverage of the GDR that
had become possible after the accreditation of journalists in East Ber-
lin in 1973, but also through Honecker’s political agenda that sought to
boost legitimacy and stability by improving standards of life in the East.
In contrast to Poland, Hungary, and even the Soviet Union itself, how-
ever, the SED leadership was not able to harness the chances aff orded by
this kind of responsiveness, nor appreciate its necessity.^64 It was appar-
ently very much aware of the fragility of its rule, which meant that the risk
of political transformation had to be avoided at all costs. Consequently,
it sought to perfect its existing regime and ensure stability for its most
important clientele by introducing “benefi ts” in terms of consumption
and social policy.
The instruments of policy advising (which were by no means public)
that had been created or reformed in the GDR in the 1960s, in particu-
lar the channels of expertise on the economy, were systematically dis-
mantled or shoved into a corner where only acclamation was allowed.
The same applied to the reports issued by the apparatus and the FDGB
on popular opinion and the “implementation of resolutions” at the local
level, as well as the economic reports coming from the planning bureau-
cracy.^65 From the very beginning, the Politburo’s Institut für Meinungs-
forschung (Institute for Opinion Polling) that was established in 1963 as a
corrective for a “scientifi cally exact picture” of “public opinion” was very
restricted in its scope, and Honecker ordered its dissolution in 1979.^66
Other institutes weathered the changing of the tide, but lacked infl uence,
such as the Zentralinstitut für Jugendforschung (Central Institute for
Youth Studies).^67 Parallel to these institutes, the Stasi regularly analyzed
the “reactions of the population,” but even this channel was shut down
as a source of information for Politburo members in 1972 after a report
was issued regarding the enthusiastic response of the East Germans to
the reelection of Willy Brandt.^68 All these institutes of political policy ad-
vising functioned according to the Communist rules of the game. Like the
party leadership, they shared the conviction that the majority of the GDR
population believed that it was in tune with the regime or at least thought
that the party had the right to determine what was objectively necessary
on the basis of its fundamental tenets. But even corrective instruments
within this system were suppressed by Honecker and his closest allies.
Since the uncontrolled infl uences coming from the West and from
within East German society were not shrinking, however, the SED was
forced to react to them. In doing so, it recognized their presence within a
subcutaneous “nonpublic” opinion discourse. In its surveillance and per-