76 FRANK BÖSCH AND JENS GIESEKE
had to go through a strenuous “after socialism” rebuilding process in the
FRG.^123 What remained was a rugged landscape of political-cultural dif-
ferences engulfi ng more than just the left side of the political spectrum
that would come to shape political life in Germany in the years to come.
Political Culture in Germany after Reunifi cation
When it joined the Federal Republic, the GDR adopted the entire political
system of West Germany. Yet the political cultures and practices on both
sides of the former Wall remained quite distinct in the 1990s, and some
of these diff erences still persist today. Not only the lasting infl uences of
both systems, but also the economic crises in East Germany fed into this
continued separation. Moreover, in an exercise in self-refl ection, schol-
ars of political culture have debated whether the developments in East
Germany can best be assessed through the quantitative opinion poll re-
search conducted in the West or, rather, participatory observations and
qualitative descriptions.^124 In comparison to other postsocialist countries
in Eastern Europe, the similarities between East and West Germany were
actually quite pronounced, and democratization after communism was
particularly successful in the former GDR.^125 Many things that are still
considered to be specifi cally East German, for example, actually corre-
spond to general trends in Western Europe as well. A transformation of
political culture also occurred in the West in the mid-1980s, but it was
overshadowed by the changes in East Germany and did not become as
clearly visible until the 1990s.
In the years and decades after 1990, however, political culture in East
and West Germany still diff ered in many respects. Whereas East Ger-
mans tended to be much more interested in politics after 1990 than West
Germans, this trend later reversed itself.^126 As diff erent studies quickly
determined, the willingness to engage in demonstrations or to sign a
letter of protest was much lower in principle in the East. That said, the
actual number of East Germans who signed petitions and joined demon-
strations proved to be similar to that of West Germans or even higher, as
in 2003/04.^127 Above all, it was the protests of East Germans who were
unemployed or on the brink of losing their jobs that boosted these fi g-
ures. At the same time, a strong feeling of powerlessness continued to
dominate public opinion, even after the transformation phase. In the mid-
1990s, for example, more East Germans than West Germans believed
that they had no political infl uence (80 to 64 percent). But, it must also be
noted that these pessimistic numbers were much greater in both parts of
Germany than in other industrial countries.^128 Similarly, most East Ger-