POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS 79
Skins, for example, they sponsored a joint birthday celebration for Hitler
in 1989.^133 The Stasi fi rst began to keep closer long-term tabs on the skin-
heads after the attack on the Zionskirche (Church of Zion) in 1987, which
prompted many neo-Nazis to dress more discreetly. Right-wing violence,
however, often erupted at soccer matches in East Germany. But these at-
tacks by right-wing radicals also sparked anti-fascist protest groups that
were not necessarily associated with the SED.^134
It must also be noted, though, that the rise of right-wing populism at the
beginning of the 1990s was also a cross-European phenomenon, as was
the increase in violence. The fading cohesive power of anti-Communism
within Christian democratic circles paved the way for an exodus from
these parties in many Western countries. Economic crises and increased
immigration also gave a boost to right-wing populists in other countries,
such as Austria, Switzerland, Italy, and France, as well as the Netherlands
and Denmark. Given this international comparison, the question remains
as to why this movement seemed to be contained at a regional level in
Germany in particular and did not gain a foothold in former West Ger-
many until the electoral success of the “Alternative for Germany” party
(AfD) in 2015. There are three main reasons that can likely account for
this. First, the success of right-wing populism is dependent on the eco-
nomic situation, which remained relatively stable in West Germany, even
during the crises of the 1990s and after 2008. Second, the Christian Dem-
ocrats in particular ensured a quite rigid policy on foreigners and asy-
lum-seekers, which helped curtail immigration with the help of new EU
guidelines after 1993. And, last, through the process of coming to terms
with the Nazi past, the majority of Germans have tended to trust the “cen-
ter” and have been quite skeptical of right-wing populists. At the end of
the 1990s, moreover, right-wing extremist violence ebbed in both parts
of the country, attesting to the success of the established parties’ eff orts
to marginalize the Far Right and right-wing populist parties.^135 This trend
began to reverse, however, with the major infl ux of refugees in 2014 and
the rise of the AfD (Alternativ für Deutschland).
Trust in the political establishment also eroded in the West, but not in
connection with the fall of the Wall. As early as 1981, party identifi cation
began to dissipate and membership in the parties dropped gradually at
fi rst, but then accelerated.^136 The often-cited term Politikverdrossenheit
(disenchantment with politics) was even named the word of the year in
- Beginning in the mid-1980s, the number of demonstrations also
began to wane in the West, although they peaked again briefl y in the
early 1990s with the protests against the Persian Gulf War. The core is-
sues that had once been espoused by the new social movements lost
their relevance. Apart from the protests against the war in Iraq, the focus