80 FRANK BÖSCH AND JENS GIESEKE
turned primarily toward the issue of how to deal with minorities, which
evolved out of the debates on asylum seekers.^137 Social austerity mea-
sures introduced by Kohl’s government, high unemployment, and dereg-
ulation also sparked protests headed by the “old social movements,” such
as the trade unions, and also the churches. Although unemployment rose
past the four-million mark in 1997/98, this did not boost the potential for
protest among those aff ected in either the East or the West. Attempts to
symbolically invoke the spirit of the Montagsdemos (Monday demonstra-
tions) in the East were particularly successful in 1998 and 2004, but their
popularity was by no means constant.
The factors propelling this depoliticization process were myriad. Dis-
appointment stemming from the inability to fully achieve political goals,
the aging of the politically active postwar generation that had become
caught up in family life, and the collapse of communism as a model and/
or bogeyman surely counted among them.^138 The growing signifi cance of
consumption and the corresponding transformation of the media with the
advent of a dual broadcasting system and later the Internet, which were
accompanied by increased social diff erentiation, were no less relevant.
Political media outlets had to make way for entertainment-based formats,
especially on TV but also in magazines. Additionally, the widespread no-
tion that the state should not interfere in economics, which had been
circulating since the 1980s, also served to delegitimize the parliamentary
system.^139 Moreover, the “German fear” that had propelled politicization
also waned. The widespread pessimism that had been dominant around
1980 morphed into increasing optimism as the economic situation im-
proved, accompanied by the generational and cultural shifts of the late
1980s.
The end of the Cold War also changed the political landscape in the
West. It led to a crisis among communist groups who lost most of their
fi nancial support, as it had come from the East. The German Commu-
nist Party (DKP), for example, had received around a half billion German
Marks form the SED in the 1980s alone.^140 Not only were they forced to
rely solely on the support of their small membership bases, but also they
crumbled in the face of internal public debates over the future of the
party. In many countries, the fall of the Wall also shook up the traditional
middle-class parties. The hitherto strong Christian democratic or con-
servative parties lost their fundamental anti-communist consensus, and
the grip of their religious-moral bonds had already been weakening. In
Italy, the Christian Democratic Party that had been governing for decades
dissolved completely in the face of scandal. A similar fate befell the Chris-
tian democratic parties in the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium, which