80 { China’s Quest
the 38th parallel. Very early in negotiations, Mao stipulated that China’s new
objective was the restoration of the prewar status quo ante, that is, reestablish-
ment of the 38th parallel as the demarcation between northern and southern
zones of Korea. Mao and Zhou initially expected that the United States would
accept relatively easily the restoration of the 38th parallel as the demarcation
line.^48 Even though the front line of actual control was well north of the 38th
parallel, Beijing believed the United States would agree to restore the status
quo ante in order to end the war. The United States simply could not fight a
protracted war, CCP leaders believed; it would pull back to the 38th parallel
in order to secure a ceasefire. The talks could then move on to consideration
of political issues underlying the war, the Chinese side agreed.^49 Again the
Chinese calculations turned out to be wrong.
Washington rejected the Chinese proposition that the 38th parallel be
reestablished as the demarcation line and initially insisted that a new line
be drawn north of Pyongyang (the North Korean capital). Fairly quickly, the
United States abandoned that demand, and insisted that the existing line
of actual control between the forces of the two sides should be taken as the
basis for the line. The US proposal would yield significant territorial gain
north of the 38th parallel for the Republic of Korea. The land gain on the
west side of the peninsula (where the North would gain some land south of
the 38th parallel) was militarily useless, since those areas were peninsulas
going nowhere. As Beijing became aware of the US refusal to restore the
status quo ante regarding the 38th parallel, it approved a proposal by Peng
Dehuai to launch a new major offensive to push US/UN forces well south of
the 38th parallel. China could than agree to withdraw north of that parallel,
achieving its goals. The offensive was duly launched on August 17, 1951, but
achieved no success against well-prepared US/UN positions. After inflicting
extremely heavy damages on CPV forces, US/UN forces counterattacked,
pushing CPV forces further north. The United States claimed the new front
line as the demarcation line between the two zones. Intense US bombing
again had devastating effects. CCP leaders then concluded that further
offensives would risk dangerous setbacks and that defensive tactics would
be better. A planned further offensive was called off, and China adopted a
new position at the negotiating table—a ceasefire in place. On November 27,
1951, the two sides agreed that the line of actual control would constitute the
demarcation line.
Release of prisoners of war (POWs) then became the focus of the “politi-
cal battle” at the negotiating table. Beijing and North Korea insisted that all
POWs be handed over to their respective governments for repatriation to
their countries of citizenship—“all for all,” this Chinese proposal was called.
US and South Korea leaders, on the other hand, insisted that POWs who did
not wish to return should not be repatriated against their will. POWs should
be offered a choice, and those who did not want to be repatriated should not