84 { China’s Quest
smallpox virus. A more detailed report to Mao and Zhou came on February
18 from Nie Rongzhen, head of the Central Staff Department of the PLA,
who reported on an investigation that was underway regarding enemy use
of insects as vectors of disease.^55 Three days later, on February 21, Mao cabled
Stalin to report that the Americans were using germ warfare in Korea: “In
the period from 28 January to 17 February 1952 the Americans used bac-
teriological weapons 8 times, [dropped] from planes and through artil-
lery shells. The Americans are equal to Japanese criminals from the 731st
detachment,” Mao told Stalin.^56 The reference to the “Japanese criminals”
and unit 731 was to the extensive research on germ warfare conducted by
Japanese units in China during World War II. Those activities had became
known after 1945 and were punished as war crimes by Soviet authorities
shortly after the war. US authorities, on the other hand, granted certain
immunities to key Japanese participants in these activities in exchange
for cooperation in understanding the scientific results achieved by these
Japanese activities. The general nature of these US arrangements became
known in the late 1940s, and was probably one factor inclining CCP leaders
to so readily conclude that the United States was following in Japan’s foot-
steps regarding BW. Linking putative US actions to earlier Japanese actions
also greatly increased the propaganda value of these charges, both within
China and globally.
To concoct evidence substantiating the BW charges, North Korean,
Chinese, and Soviet officials cooperated in creating false areas of infection
to be shown to two international investigation committees invited to inspect
the supposedly infected areas. In the words of the deputy chief of the counter-
espionage department of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs and former
advisor to North Korea’s ministry of public health in a report to Soviet secret
police head Lavrenti Beria:
The Koreans stated that the Americans had supposedly repeatedly
exposed several areas of their country to plague and cholera. To prove
these facts, the North Koreans, with the assistance of our advisors, cre-
ated false areas of exposure. In June–July 1952 a delegation of specialists
in bacteriology from the World Peace Council arrived in North Korea.
Two false areas of exposure were prepared. In connection with this, the
Koreans insisted on obtaining cholera bacteria from corpses which they
would get from China.^57
A statement by another Soviet participant in the creation of these false
areas of infection reported: “In the opinion of the North Korean govern-
ment, this was necessary in order to compromise the Americans in this war.
However, to all outward appearances, they seriously believed the information
about this that they received from the Chinese.”^58 Finally, on May 2, 1953,