90 { China’s Quest
Before Chinese advisors deployed to Vietnam, they were instructed to avoid
arrogance and attitudes of big power chauvinism. They were not to display
contempt or seek to impose their views on their Vietnamese associates. Nor
should they take offense if Vietnamese refused to adopt their suggestions.
Mao and Luo Guibo were acutely aware of China’s long history of domina-
tion of Vietnam, and strove to prevent old Chinese habits from spoiling the
creation of a new era of equal cooperation.
In mid-1950, the CCP assigned another accomplished PLA general, Chen
Geng, to draw up a plan for securing Viet Minh control over the mountainous
terrain along Vietnam’s border with China. The plan Chen Geng devised was
carefully premised on the still-limited military experience and capabilities
of Viet Minh forces, and would build step by step toward success in accord
with the strategic principles of Mao Zedong. The offensive was successful.
By October, almost the entire border region was under Viet Minh control.
Transportation lines with China were no longer blocked by French forces, and
Viet Minh forces were positioned to move into the more densely populated
Red River delta. Chinese assistance had transformed the battlefield balance
between Viet Minh and French forces. Figure 3-2 illustrates the CMAG–Viet
Minh campaigns of 1950–1952.Gulf of
TonkinRed River
DeltaRed(^) R.
Hanoi
Dien Bien Phu,
1954
Kunming,
Yunnan
Province
Nanning,
Guangxi
Province
VIETNAM
CHINA
LAOS
Approximate area
of Viet Minh control,
end 1951Rail lines to
forward areasBorder zone secured
Lai Chau, nal July–October 1950
objective of northwest
campaign, early 1952FIGU R E 3-2 CMAG–Viet Minh Campaigns of 1950–1952
Source: Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietname Wars, 1950–1975, (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill,
2000), p. 27.