War in Korea and Indochina } 91
Early in 1952, the CMAG proposed and then drafted a plan for a major
offensive to secure control over the mountainous region in northwest
Vietnam. Success in this operation would secure the rear for Viet Minh forces
for a subsequent thrust into the Red River delta. It would also open Laos to
the “liberation struggle.” It was “crucially important to help Laos achieve
liberation,” Liu Shaoqi told the CCP Central Military Commission in April
1952 as the CMAG proposal was under deliberation.^71 The VWP requested
the deployment of PLA forces to northwestern Vietnam as part of the oper-
ation. The CCP declined that proposal, saying it was an important Chinese
principle not to send Chinese forces to Vietnam. The CCP did agree, however,
to deploy some units to the border to show support for the operation. The
operation was launched in October 1952, and by mid-December the north-
west was under Viet Minh control and liberation forces were staging for
movement into Laos. Zhou Enlai briefed Stalin on the northwest offensive
during August–September 1952 talks in Moscow. Stalin approved the oper-
ation, suggesting its success might help create an advantageous position for
negotiations with France. In line with the spirit of the understandings of July
1949, the PRC and the USSR cooperated closely to expand the frontiers of the
socialist camp in Asia.