102 { China’s Quest
conclusion of a US-ROC mutual security treaty.^23 A major difficulty quickly
emerged: what would be the territorial scope of such a treaty? Would it cover
the Offshore Islands, scattered along the coast of continental China but still
held by Nationalist forces? At the end of the Korean War, there were three
main islands still in Nationalist hands: Jinmen (Quemoy) in Xiamen harbor,
Mazu (Matsu) off Fuzhou harbor, and the Dachen (Tachen) group north of
Wenzhou, Zhejiang province. KMT leaders, especially Chiang Kai-shek, saw
retention of those islands as a symbolic and material link between Taiwan
and the mainland, and were determined to defend them. US officials, how-
ever, felt that commitment of Nationalist forces to defense of the Offshores
weakened the defense of Taiwan itself. Nationalist forces committed to the
Offshores would be useless and cut off in the event of a communist attack
on Taiwan. The islands should be defended only very lightly, US leaders
thought, with Taiwan’s defense perimeter drawn down the middle of the
Taiwan Strait. US leaders also understood that a war with China for defense
of the tiny and very far forward Offshores would be difficult to sell to the
American people.
Nationalist leaders saw US unwillingness to defend the Offshores as man-
ifestation of a desire to separate Taiwan from China, perhaps as part of a US
accommodation with the communist regime. This suspicion was not entirely
baseless. An independent Taiwan and comity with the communist-ruled PRC
might serve US interests nicely, a fact that was occasionally deliberated in
top-level US policy councils. Nationalist leaders were ardent Chinese nation-
alists, as strongly opposed as CCP leaders to “Taiwan independence.” The
dispute between the CCP and the KMT was about who should rule China,
including Taiwan, not whether or not Taiwan was a part of China. US-ROC
talks on a mutual security treaty continued off and on throughout 1953 and- Finally, in June 1954, Chiang Kai-shek revived flagging US interest in a
treaty by agreeing to seek US approval prior to undertaking major military
activities (such as an attack on the mainland). US-ROC talks resumed and
went into high gear.
From Beijing’s perspective, a US mutual security treaty with Taiwan con-
stituted an egregious interference in China’s internal affairs. Even worse, it
committed US military strength to Taiwan’s defense, making virtually im-
possible PLA liberation of Taiwan for the foreseeable future. US Secretary
of State Dulles also aspired to weave together into a comprehensive system
all US mutual security agreements in East Asia—with Japan, South Korea,
the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, and SEATO. If Taiwan were in-
cluded in that system, it would further institutionalize Taiwan’s separation
from the mainland, making seizure of the island even more difficult.
Mao decided on a military demonstration that would hopefully force the
United States to reconsider its “hostile policy toward the PRC,” i.e., a US alli-
ance with Taiwan. This military demonstration would make clear that Beijing