The Bandung Era } 109
China’s relations warmed after encounters between Zhou and Sihanouk at
Geneva and Bandung. Sihanouk and Zhou exchanged visits in 1956, and the
two countries established diplomatic relations in 1958. With Indonesia, too,
relations began to thaw. These were significant breakthroughs for Beijing.
China also achieved an important understanding with Pakistan during
Bandung. Pakistan in the mid-1950s was one of the United States’ most impor-
tant containment partners, allied by treaty with the United States and cooper-
ating with Turkey, Iran, and Iraq in West Asia and with SEATO in Southeast
Asia. From the US perspective, these collective security structures were in-
tended to contain communism supported by the Sino-Soviet bloc. From
Pakistan’s perspective, however, the key, if unstated, purpose was to strengthen
Pakistan’s position vis-à-vis India. At Bandung, Zhou and Pakistani Prime
Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra held two private meetings during which
Bogra explained the logic of Pakistan’s alliances. Pakistan’s alliances were
not directed against the PRC, Bogra said. If the United States launched a war
against China, Pakistan would not be involved in it, he assured Zhou.^39 Zhou
tested the sincerity of Bogra’s assurances by reporting them to the Political
Committee of the Bandung conference, lauding them as creating mutual un-
derstanding and agreement among conference participants on the key ques-
tion of peace and cooperation. Zhou added, “I am sure the Prime Minister of
Pakistan will have no objection to these views of mine.” Bogra rose to the occa-
sion by publicly repeating his assurances to Zhou. In October of the next year,
Pakistani’s prime minister, by then Huseyn Suhrawardy, first visited China,
a visit reciprocated by Zhou in December 1956. The joint communiqué signed
at the end of Zhou’s visit announced “There is no real conflict of interest be-
tween the two countries.” Beijing assigned former PLA Major General Geng
Biao to serve as ambassador to Pakistan from 1956 to 1960. Assigning a prom-
inent security specialist like Geng Biao to Pakistan was evidence of Beijing’s
understanding of Pakistan’s importance in the regional balance. It would be
several years before Beijing decided that relations with India were bad enough
that China should align openly and fully with Pakistan against India. But a
common Chinese and Pakistani understanding of the geostrategic basis of
that future entente cordiale was reached at Bandung.
Bandung and China’s Relations with India
Rivalry between China and India for status among the newly emerging
nations surfaced first at Bandung. Beginning with the Korean War, Nehru
began courting PRC friendship by acting as China’s friend and benefactor
in various international fora. India opposed US-led efforts at the United
Nations to condemn Chinese aggression in Korea. It voted against the United
States and for the PRC on the question of Chinese representation in the UN.