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about Soviet reluctance to supply arms to Egypt. The Western powers were
proposing an embargo on weapons sales to the Middle East as a way to tamp
down tensions, and Moscow was unwilling to contradict that Western initi-
ative. Nasser asked Zhou if China might be able to help out. China agreed to
try, and raised the matter with Moscow. This led to Soviet authorization of
Czechoslovak sale of weapons to Egypt.^21 Moscow’s inclination to go along
with Western plans for an arms embargo, and its unwillingness to directly
arm Egypt for its anti-imperialist struggle, were seen by Mao as Soviet lack
of resolve. From the CCP perspective, acquisition of arms was part of an
Afro-Asian country’s sovereign rights, essential for defense against Western
imperialism. For Moscow to ignore that right in order to reduce tension
with those Western imperialists was sheer, unprincipled capitulation. Under
Chinese and Egyptian pressure, Moscow backed away from the arms em-
bargo proposal, but was unwilling to itself supply arms to Egypt.
China recognized Egypt’s important regional role and moved quickly to
deepen ties with it following initial contacts between Zhou and Nasser at
Bandung. In February 1956, the chairman of the China Islamic Association
led a large Chinese delegation to Egypt. Three months later, Egypt became the
first Arab country to recognize the People’s Republic of China. Two days after
recognition, Zhou Enlai invited Nasser to visit China, and defense minister
Peng Dehuai invited Egypt’s defense minister to pay a similar visit. Both invi-
tations were accepted. In late July 1956, only a few days after China’s new am-
bassador presented his credentials to Nasser, the Egyptian leader announced
the nationalization of the Suez Canal. It took Beijing nearly three weeks to
unequivocally endorse that move. This may have had to do with Zhou Enlai’s
Bandung-era moderation and concern for the legalities of freedom of nav-
igation. In any case, Mao ended equivocation in his opening speech to the
Eighth CCP Congress on September 15, when he declared “We firmly support
the entirely lawful action of the Government of Egypt in taking back the Suez
Canal company, and resolutely oppose any attempt to encroach on the sover-
eignty of Egypt and start armed aggression against that country.”^22
When Israel, Britain, and France invaded Egypt at the end of October to
seize control of the canal, China quickly supported Egypt. A PRC govern-
ment statement warned of “inestimably grave consequences” for the aggres-
sors. Many Renmin ribao editorials and statements by government leaders
voiced various threats and warnings to the aggressors. On October 1, Defense
Minister Peng declared that the Chinese people would support Egypt in its
just struggle against imperialism. During the Suez War, 250,000 Chinese re-
portedly registered to serve as “volunteers” in Egypt. Transport difficulties
made that move purely symbolic, yet it was a potent symbol of PRC support
for the Arab people’s struggle against US imperialism.
Again Moscow equivocated, at least from Mao’s perspective. Moscow, who
unlike China did have a real ability to intervene in the Middle East, drew