152 { China’s Quest
Nehru brought Nehru’s romantic handling of China policy under growing
criticism in India. Nehru responded to that criticism by trying to show that
he was tough-minded in dealing with China. Both Chinese and Indian policy
were moving toward confrontation.
The uprising in Tibet and the growing movement of Tibetans to and
from India caused the PLA to establish firmer control over forward areas.
Simultaneously, Indian patrols were pushing into territory that New Delhi
believed was Indian although previously unoccupied. The inevitable clash
occurred near Longju on the eastern Himalayan border in August. One Indian
soldier was killed. Another skirmish occurred in Aksai Chin in October. In
these and subsequent clashes on the border, the Chinese side was invariably
better prepared and acted with greater military effect than the Indian.
The day of the second clash, China’s foreign ministry sought the support
of Beijing’s Soviet ally in the escalating conflict with India. China briefed the
Soviet side on recent developments along the border and requested Soviet
“understanding” of China’s position. Three days later, Moscow replied. The
Soviet Union “regretted” the conflict between China and India and blamed
it on “those people who plot to create a tense international situation.” Beijing
took that as veiled attribution to China of responsibility for the clash. Moscow
ignored Beijing’s request for support and proclaimed itself neutral in the
Sino-Indian dispute. Beijing understood Moscow’s implicit message: China
was to blame for the dispute. By Beijing’s reckoning, this was the first time a
socialist country had supported a capitalist country against a socialist one. It
was also, again by Beijing’s reckoning, the first open revelation of disagree-
ments between the CCP and the CPSU.^9
The Sino-Indian conflict put Moscow in a quandary. India was a leader
among the developing countries and was favorably inclined toward the Soviet
Union. Indian leftists, including Nehru, were enamored with Soviet-style eco-
nomic planning and hoped to learn from the USSR in that regard. The ideal
of many on the Indian left was to combine Soviet-style economic planning
with British-style parliamentary democracy. Relations with the Soviet Union
were thus attractive for India. After Stalin’s death, India quickly emerged as a
favored recipient of Soviet assistance. American aid to India could not (by US
law) go to state-sector industrial projects in India. Soviet aid did. The Indian
concept of non-alignment in the 1950s envisioned maintaining decent rela-
tions with both sides of the Cold War confrontation, and Moscow found this
an effective counter to US efforts to “contain” Soviet influence. In 1955, there
was an exchange of summit visits by Khrushchev and Nehru. Come 1959,
Khrushchev was loath to choose between China and India, and unhappy with
Chinese policy for putting him in that situation.
When Khrushchev arrived in Beijing at the end of September shortly after
his successful tour of the United States (discussed below), he explained Soviet
views in hope that Moscow could avoid a choice between its ally China and