Sino-Indian Conflict and the Sino-Soviet Alliance } 155
told Mao. Mao replied to Khrushchev “with obvious displeasure and testily,”
according to the Russian transcript, and refused to budge on the American
prisoners.
Khrushchev raised the issue of the failure of Mao to inform him in July
1958 before shelling the Offshores. Mao, backed by Zhou, insisted that the
PLA General Staff Department had, in fact, informed the senior Soviet mil-
itary advisor in China of those intentions a month before the bombardment
began. The man had reported, Khrushchev said, but had said nothing about
a plan to bombard the Offshores. Probably the notification that Mao and
Zhou mentioned had been designed to be so low-key as to draw no notice that
might precipitate Soviet intervention to block the planned action, but pro-
vide a basis for later insisting that notification had in fact been given. In any
case, Khrushchev complained during the 1959 meeting that because a “prewar
situation” had existed regarding Taiwan, and because the Soviet Union was
compelled [by the 1950 treaty] to publicly declare its willingness to defend the
PRC in the event of “aggravation” of the situation over Taiwan, understand-
ings that might exist confidentially between Beijing and Moscow could be
very dangerous.^17 “We would think you ought to look for ways to relax the
[Taiwan] situation,” Khrushchev said. The Soviet leader mentioned Lenin’s
establishment of an ostensibly independent Far Eastern Republic in 1920 as
an example of the sort of flexibility Moscow had in mind.^18
This suggestion was not well received by the Chinese side. Mao and Zhou
both insisted that relations with Taiwan would be discussed with Chiang
Kai-shek, and US relations with Taiwan would be discussed with the United
States. Implicitly, Moscow didn’t have a role regarding Taiwan—other than
supporting Beijing when it found itself in a confrontation with the United
States. “You always refuse to work out [with us] a policy on this question
[of Taiwan] that we can understand,” Khrushchev complained. “[W] e do
not know what kind of policy you will have on this issue tomorrow.” Why
bombard a place and create a crisis if you didn’t intend to seize that place,
Khrushchev wanted to know. The Soviet leader completely failed to under-
stand (as did almost everyone at the time) that Mao’s deliberate precipitation
of the Straits crisis in August 1958 was more about domestic policy than about
foreign policy.
Khrushchev then turned to the clash on the Sino-Indian border in August
that had left several Indians dead and precipitated a crisis. “Do you really
want us to approve of your conflict with India?” Khrushchev asked Mao. “It
would be stupid on our part.” When the Chinese side argued that the Indian
side had been the first to open fire, Khrushchev still insisted that China could
and should have found a way to resolve the conflict peacefully in order to win
over “fellow-traveler” Nehru to the socialist side in the world struggle. About
halfway through the session, Mao became quiet and let other members of
the Chinese delegation, one after the other, assault Khrushchev. Chen Yi, Lin