176 { China’s Quest
that Mao intended a link between international confrontation and domestic
radicalism in 1962 is weaker than for Korea in 1950 or the Taiwan Strait crisis
in 1958, some scholars have surmised that such a link probably existed.^25 As
in 1950 and 1958, an atmosphere of international crisis assisted Mao’s efforts
to overcome hesitation about revolutionary advance and move China down
the correct road of class struggle and progress toward genuine socialism. But
as in 1950 and 1958, considerations of domestic mobilization of revolutionary
forces did not preclude considerations of foreign threat. In 1962, China’s lead-
ers felt they confronted sustained Indian “nibbling” of Chinese territory,
which had to be dealt a strong, punitive blow.
The hard realities of military power in the high Himalayas overwhelm-
ingly favored China in the early 1960s, and India’s apparent disregard of this
was part of what mystified Chinese leaders and caused them to conclude that
New Delhi must be inspired by nefarious forces. PLA forces had entered Tibet
in 1951 and spent the next decade building roads linking that region to China
proper. By 1962, these roads kept PLA forces well supplied. Further Chinese
forces entered Tibet for counterinsurgency operations as rebellion flared, and
Chinese soldiers became acclimated to operations at Tibet’s extremely high
elevation. As part of counterinsurgency operations, PLA built roads and posi-
tions in forward areas as part of efforts to seal the border. And throughout
the 1950s, the PLA underwent sweeping modernization along Soviet lines and
with substantial Soviet assistance. PLA capabilities were honed in Korea. By
1962, the PLA was a well-trained and -equipped and battle-hardened force
used to operations in Tibet. India, on the other hand, was led by men who
believed that war was an outdated contrivance. Little attention was paid to
modernization of India’s military. Forward areas along the borders with
China were left undeveloped, without roads, bridges, and depots to facili-
tate logistical movements. When Indian forces finally began advancing into
forward areas in 1962, they found the going very hard. Logistical lines for
Indian forces were tenuous. Nor were Indian troops acclimated to or prop-
erly equipped for high-elevation operations. When Chinese and Indian forces
began encountering one another in forward areas in 1962, it was the Chinese
forces who held the tactically superior positions.
In spite of its weak military position in the frontier regions, in November
1961 India adopted a new “Forward Policy” designed to establish effective
Indian control over frontier territory claimed by India in the Himalayan
Mountains. According to the official but long-secret Indian report on India’s
1962 war with China, in fall 1961 a wide empty area existed between India’s
forwardmost outposts and Chinese outposts to their north. Chinese border
troops were gradually pushing into this “empty area” establishing outposts,
according to the Indian report. In order to demonstrate that the remaining
area was not empty and thus deter Chinese advance, Indian forces were or-
dered to patrol as far as the crest line claimed by India as the international