194 { China’s Quest
of the other,” Mao told Ayub.^57 As the insurgency in Indian Kashmir flared
in fall 1965 and India responded by mobilizing troops on Pakistan’s borders,
Beijing strengthened its deterrent support for Pakistan. On August 29, Beijing
protested India’s purported “flagrant disregard for Chinese sovereignty” on
the Sikkim-China border at Chola Pass, where India had built “aggressive
military structures on Chinese territory”: “The Chinese government must
warn India that if it does not immediately stop all such acts of aggression and
provocation, it must bear full responsibility for the consequences that may
arise there from.”^58 Coming only three years after 1962, these threats were
taken very seriously in India. In September, Renmin ribao declared China’s
support for the “Kashmir people’s struggle for national self-determination.”^59
India faced a two-front threat, in the West and in the North.
On September 6, India launched a large conventional assault on West
Pakistan. Intense fighting entailed some of the largest armored battles since
World War II. On September 7, Zhou Enlai termed the Indian assault on
Pakistan an “act of naked aggression.” Later the same day, Zhou informed
the Pakistani ambassador that China was watching developments and con-
sidering its response. Zhou sought two assurances from Karachi in the event
Chinese entered the war in support of Pakistan. First, Pakistan would not
submit to any Kashmir solution favorable to India. Second, Pakistan would
not submit to US, Soviet, or United Nations pressure for a pro-Indian
Kashmir solution. In effect, Zhou was seeking a guarantee that Karachi
would not abandon Beijing. Foreign Minister Chen Yi flew to Karachi to tell
Pakistani foreign minister Z. A. Bhutto that China would go to any length to
support Pakistan. President Ayub Khan provided the guarantees requested
by Zhou Enlai.^60 On September 8, PRC President Liu Shaoqi sent a letter to
Ayub promising Chinese support in the event the war continued. If India
attacked East Pakistan, China would counter by opening operations in the
Himalayas. The same day, Beijing radio announced that Chinese forces on
the border had been put on alert and that unless India dismantled all military
structures on the Sikkim-Tibet border and ceased its “frenzied provocative
activities,” all consequences would lie with India. A week later, at midnight
on September 16, as a tank battle raged between India and Pakistan around
Lahore, a deputy Chinese foreign minister summoned the Indian chargé in
Beijing and informed him that unless India dismantled all military structures
on the Sikkim-Tibetan border “within three days of the delivery of the present
note,” India would “bear full responsibility for all the grave consequences.”
This was an ultimatum threatening Chinese attack. Mao was apparently pre-
pared to enter the war in support of Pakistan.^61
China’s threat of intervention produced US support for a Soviet effort to
mediate the India-Pakistan conflict. Pakistan’s leaders faced a choice. They
could accept Chinese support and assistance, and wage a protracted war
against India in alliance with China. In that event, India was likely to be