272 { China’s Quest
to demand the recall for examination and self-criticism of ambassadors and
senior diplomatic staff posted abroad.
In January 1967, as part of a nationwide “seizure of power” by Red Guard
organizations, Red Guards “seized power” in the foreign affairs system.
Foreign Minister Chen Yi (still in that position) met with the newly es-
tablished “revolutionary core” in the MFA and supported their “seizure of
power,” but insisted that conduct of foreign relations remained the exclusive
domain of China’s central leaders. The role of the “revolutionary core,” Chen
said, was to guide the Cultural Revolution in the foreign affairs system, not to
conduct China’s diplomacy. Chen’s attempts to limit the Cultural Revolution’s
impact on China’s diplomacy did not last long and would be the basis for
Mao’s ultimate loss of faith in Chen. Chen’s position was weakened when he
was compelled to make a self-criticism before “masses” of ten thousand for
his earlier following of the Liu Shaoqi–Deng Xiaoping line in 1966 when he
had attempted to limit the scope of Red Guard rebellion in the foreign affairs
system. Mao had preapproved Chen’s “confession,” and the Maoist leader
Chen Boda attended the session to ensure that it was smoothly accepted by
the “revolutionary masses.” Still, Chen became more vulnerable because of
his moderate approach to foreign affairs. The frank-speaking Chen had this
to say, for example, at a Politburo meeting in February 1967 regarding the
provocative activities of Chinese students transiting Moscow that had pre-
cipitated the confrontation with the Soviet Union:
The Chinese students took the lead in reading Chairman Mao’s quota-
tions in the Red Square. That was the beginning. Then people began to
read them everywhere in the world. This means hitting in all directions
and copying things [of the Cultural Revolution] in foreign countries.
This gave rise to problems with the Soviet revisionists and the French
imperialists. The imperialists, the revisionists and the reactionaries all
fell upon us. We have landed ourselves in a passive position.^17
Such frank criticism of radical policies led Mao to conclude that Chen
was part of the “February adverse current” that had emerged to oppose the
Red Guard seizure of power the previous month. This was a far more serious
charge against Chen than his attempts to restrain the Red Guards in late- Mao’s negative judgment of Chen gave an immense boost to the Red
Guards within the foreign affairs system. Zhou Enlai sought to limit radical
attacks on Chen and his supporters Ji Pengfei and vice foreign minister Qiao
Guanghua, but those efforts failed. Radicals then tried to attack Zhou for hav-
ing supported Chen, but Mao personally intervened to veto that. Zhou Enlai
was simply too important to the continued functioning of the government.
Early in 1967, Zhou ordered the recall of all China’s ambassadors and up to
two-thirds of embassy staff. The one exception to this recall was Huang Hua
in Cairo, who was only recently been appointed ambassador and had thus