Rapprochement with the United States } 291
policy recommendation was to accelerate preparations for war: calling up
militias, strengthening defense industry, and so on.
The conclusions of the first two reports were not bold enough for Mao. In
mid-May, Zhou, following Mao’s directions, asked the marshals to try again.
They should not be “restricted by any established framework”—such as the
standard anti-imperialist and antirevisionist line just laid out at the Ninth
Party Congress in April—but try to help Mao “gain command of the new
tendency in the strategic development” in the world. Zhou stressed to the
marshals that Mao had asked them to undertake this task because of their
superior strategic vision. Zhou also appointed two senior diplomats to join
the group to “assist discussion” and draft reports. These diplomats presum-
ably would have ensured that diplomatic maneuvering would be considered
as part of China’s national security repertoire. Yet that does not seem to have
happened. The next marshals’ report came on July 11. It still did not raise the
question of changes in China’s foreign policies. The report declared that both
the United States and the Soviet Union were “branches” of the “international
bourgeoisie.” Both were hostile to China, even though they were enemies of
one another. Because of this, it was unlikely that the United States and the
Soviet Union would launch a large-scale war against China, either jointly
or separately. Still, there was no intimation of tilting toward Washington to
deter Moscow.
A week after the marshals’ third report, Beijing received further signals
of Washington’s desire for a dialogue. On July 21, the US State Department
announced the relaxation of restrictions on travel by US citizens to China.
On the nonpublic channel, early in 1969 the administration terminated sup-
port for Tibetan guerrillas still conducting military raids into Tibet from an
isolated region in western Nepal.^8 In the Taiwan Strait, previously regular
patrols by the US navy became intermittent.^9 The marshals’ group recon-
vened late in July. This time they finally recognized the possibility of “utiliz-
ing the contradiction” between the United States and the Soviet Union, but
reached the conclusion that border negotiations with the Soviet Union might
strengthen China’s “struggle against America.” In other words, Beijing might
play the Soviet card against the United States!
Before the marshals’ group could draft their fourth report, the clash on
the Xinjiang border on August 13 occurred. That large-scale battle between
Soviet and Chinese forces finally pushed the marshals’ group to conceive of
using the United States to deter the Soviet Union. The report, submitted to
Zhou Enlai on September 17, noted that “the card of the United States” could
help China prepare for a major confrontation with the Soviet Union. In line
with this, resuming the ambassadorial talks with the United States might be
useful, the report suggested. Orally, Chen Yi conveyed some “unconventional
thoughts” to Zhou Enlai: in addition to resuming the Warsaw ambassadorial
talks, China might take the initiative in proposing talks with the United States