Rapprochement with the United States } 297
Ye was one of China’s top military leaders since the demise of Lin Biao. Ye’s
presence sent the message that the PLA supported China’s new diplomatic
track. Once the American group was ensconced in the Diaoyutai (Fisherman’s
Terrace) state guest house in western Beijing, Zhou Enlai paid Kissinger a
visit within four hours. Zhou, a premier, was considerably higher-status than
a mere presidential advisor, yet he bent diplomatic protocol to display cour-
tesy toward the Americans. In formal talks with Kissinger, Zhou stressed his
appreciation of Kissinger’s “friendship” toward China, a tactic that made it
psychologically harder for Kissinger to disagree with China’s positions.
Mao instructed Zhou to “brag” to Kissinger about China’s ability to face
and defeat even an invasion by the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan.
In line with Mao’s instructions, Zhou told Kissinger that in an “extreme situa-
tion,” China would wage a protracted people’s war to grind down the invaders
and defeat them. This would be difficult, but China was confident it could do
it, Zhou said on Mao’s orders. Kissinger understood this as a way of elicit-
ing the US attitude toward possible Soviet attack, and by extension US assis-
tance in such an eventuality, without seeming to ask for US help. It was a way
of asking for US assistance against the Soviet Union without appearing as
a supplicant.^19 This image of China standing alone and defending itself in a
self-reliant manner against all enemies became the standard line for the PRC
over the next decade—while, in actuality, China was relying on US support
against the Soviet Union. It became, in effect, a sort of camouflage for China’s
using the American barbarians to check the Soviet barbarians. On July 15,
1971, simultaneously in Beijing and Los Angeles, Kissinger’s recent visit to
China was announced, along with the news that President Nixon would soon
visit China. That announcement was a bombshell rivaling the ping-pong di-
plomacy three months earlier.
The Mao-Nixon Summit
Nixon’s group arrived in Beijing on February 21, 1972. The Nixon adminis-
tration had positioned satellite television broadcasting equipment in Beijing,
so Nixon-in-China events could be broadcast live back to the United States.
Nixon, like Mao, understood the political utility of pictures as propaganda.
When Nixon’s airplane arrived in Beijing, at the bottom of the ramp to wel-
come him was Zhou Enlai.^20 The drama of the event was deliberately accentu-
ated by Nixon descending the stairway without his entourage to the bottom
to shake hands with Zhou. With careful discipline, Zhou waited until Nixon
extended his hand before raising his own hand to reciprocate. Chinese audi-
ences would notice such matters, even if Americans did not. The Nixon-Zhou
handshake evoked John Foster Dulles’ refusal to shake hands with Zhou at
Geneva in 1954. The Nixon-Zhou handshake symbolized the abandonment of