318 { China’s Quest
years, and was determined to keep Vietnam from dominating his country.
Putting Sihanouk back in power in Phnom Penh, strengthened by major ele-
ments of the existing Phnom Penh government plus Chinese and American
support, would act as a barrier to implementation of the ultrarevolutionary
policies of the Khmer Rouge and thus Vietnamese domination.
By 1973, it was clear to Zhou that Hanoi sought to bring both Cambodia
and Laos under its domination once South Vietnam was conquered. With
Soviet backing, this Hanoi-led “Indochinese federation” would have sub-
stantial influence in Southeast Asia. Thus, keeping Cambodia fully indepen-
dent of Vietnamese domination was, Zhou concluded, a key to thwarting
Hanoi’s “Indochina federation” scheme, and a broad Sihanouk-led coali-
tion government in Phnom Penh was the best way to achieve that. To this
end, in May, Huang Hua, then ambassador to the United Nations, informed
Henry Kissinger that China was willing to convey to Sihanouk (then resid-
ing in Beijing and nominal head of the united front that included the Khmer
Rouge) an American-drafted proposal to initiate negotiations toward con-
stituting a Sihanouk-led coalition government for Cambodia. The incentive
for the Khmer Rouge to agree to this arrangement was an end to the heavy
US bombing of Cambodia that had been underway for many months by
mid-1973, with devastating effect on Khmer Rouge forces. The prospect of
an end to that bombing was the incentive Zhou Enlai would offer to induce
the Khmer Rouge to forgo total rule and accept a subordinate position in a
Sihanouk-led government. By mid-1973, the United States and the PRC were
working in tandem toward the common objective of keeping Cambodia free
from domination by Hanoi.
The leverage of US bombing, underpinning the key role that China was
to play in persuading the Khmer Rouge to compromise, evaporated when
the US Congress mandated at the end of June a cutoff of all funding for US
combat operations in or over all of Indochina. Two weeks after the congres-
sional cutoff, Han Xu informed Brent Scowcroft that, for a variety of reasons,
China would no longer able to communicate the US proposal to Sihanouk.
When a US congressional delegation visited Beijing a month later, met with
Zhou, and bragged about Congress’ role in ending US bombing, Zhou be-
came visibly angry. The US legislators could not understand why Zhou was
unhappy with congressional action cutting off bombing long condemned by
China, including by Zhou himself in his opening remarks to the congres-
sional delegation.
The 1973 PRC-US effort to install a neutralist government in Phnom Penh
was one of the first efforts by the two countries to work in tandem toward
common objectives. It failed because of an abrupt American volte-face. After
China had put its credibility with various Cambodian parties on the line
by agreeing to transmit Washington’s proposal to Sihanouk and the Khmer
Rouge, the United States Congress jerked away the key premise of China’s