328 { China’s Quest
would fall in this category of exploitation of contradictions between the two
hegemony-seeking superpowers. In certain periods, one of the superpowers
might be more aggressive than the other, and it might be possible to unite
with the less aggressive superpower against the more aggressive one. This
sort of exploitation of contradictions was entirely correct. Throughout the
1974–1982 period, it was apparent to China’s leaders that the Soviet Union
was precisely the more dangerous of the two superpowers. As Deng Xiaoping
said on December 1, 1975 in a speech welcoming President Gerald Ford on his
first trip to China, “the country most zealously preaching peace” was in fact
the “most dangerous source of war.”^26 Everyone understood these as allu-
sions to the Soviet Union.
The Three Worlds theory placed China, along with the rest of the Third
World, on a higher moral plane than the United States. It explained how
China’s alignment with the United States was not mere crass power politics,
but served a higher moral purpose. It also provided an ideologically adequate
explanation of China’s return to diplomatic maneuver. While China might
maneuver like the United States or the Soviet Union with diplomatic activ-
ity around the world, China would never merely seek merely its own selfish
interest. China sought the emancipation of all humanity. China would never
be a superpower like the United States. In practice, the theory could distin-
guish between the two hegemony-seeking First World superpowers.
By providing a mechanism for “mobilizing all possible forces against
the primary enemy,” Mao’s Three Worlds Theory was similar to the
anti-Japanese and then anti-KMT united fronts devised by Mao in the 1930s
and 1940s. But those earlier united fronts were essentially mechanisms for
mobilizing forces behind party leadership to bring about a future revolu-
tionary restructuring of society.^27 The united front against hegemony did
not function, even theoretically, as a mechanism for revolutionary mobi-
lization. It maintained a pretense at revolution, but in fact functioned at
the level of governments and states in pursuit of national security goals.
Linkages with foreign revolutionary parties remained as vestiges. After
1978, under Deng Xiaoping support for foreign revolutionary struggles
would be scrapped within a continuing framework of united front against
Soviet expansionism.
Diplomacy was a key instrument of China’s effort to counter possible
Soviet encirclement. Thailand and the Philippines were early targets of
China’s anti-Soviet diplomatic offensive. The United States, the traditional
backer of both the Philippines and Thailand, had just suffered a monumental
defeat in Indochina, while Hanoi, with revolutionary and nationalist aspira-
tions for Southeast Asia plus large, well-trained and well-armed forces, had
emerged as the strongest military power in Southeast Asia. Both Bangkok
and Manila were quite interested to hear what Beijing might have to say about
the new situation.