342 { China’s Quest
Normalization of PRC-FRG relations occurred in October 1972 in the af-
termath of China’s entry into the United Nations and Sino-American rap-
prochement. As Chinese concerns with Soviet expansionism mounted in
the mid-1970s, Beijing resorted to two instruments to nudge the FRG toward
a more vigilant posture with the Soviet Union. The first instrument was a
propaganda campaign. Large volumes of speeches, Xinhua reports, news-
paper articles, and radio broadcasts pounded home the dire Soviet military
threat confronting West Europe. This propaganda called for strong German
and West European support for NATO, along with increased military prepa-
rations and expenditures. A favorite trope of Chinese commentary was to
convey CDU views on these issues. Support for European integration and
independence—but always within the context of NATO and continued pres-
ence of US military forces on the continent—was another theme of Chinese
com menta r y.
Détente with the Soviet Union was a bête noire of Chinese propaganda at
this juncture. From Beijing’s perspective, détente was a gigantic Soviet decep-
tion lulling Westerners into letting down their guard while the Soviet Union
built up its forces and aggressively expanded its positions around the world.
It would at best result in a sort of “self-Finlandization” of West Europe, with
Bonn and other European capitals doing nothing that incurred Soviet dis-
pleasure. At worst, détente could become “another Munich,” with Western
Europe making major concessions to Moscow’s demands, allowing the Soviet
Union to secure its European positions and move forces east to confront
China.^57
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was a spe-
cial object of Chinese concern. The CSCE began with talks in Helsinki in
November 1972 and culminated in the signature of the Helsinki Final Act by
thirty-five states on August 1, 1975. Moscow’s major objective in the CSCE
process was to legitimize its control over the East European countries, while
West European leaders saw it as a way of reducing tension, expanding coop-
eration, and securing Soviet recognition of the importance of human rights
across Europe. In addition to the Helsinki Final Act, the CSCE process estab-
lished an organization, although that organization was without enforcement
authority. Beijing believed that the entire CSCE process was a dangerous
Soviet attempt to lull the West into pacifism. Beijing’s view was exempli-
fied by an article in Peking Review just after the signature of the Helsinki
Final Act.^58 The CSCE “will only bring a false sense of security to the West
European people,” the article said. Moscow was attempting to “lull the
European people and split Western Europe and NATO so as to achieve dom-
ination in Europe under the smokescreen of ‘détente.’ ” Moscow planned to
use the CSCE “to disarm the West, not just militarily, but politically and psy-
chologically as well.”^59 Moscow’s objective was to tranquilize West European