344 { China’s Quest
Shortly after Schmidt’s visit, Strauss paid another visit to Beijing, where
he enunciated views congruent with Beijing’s—and to which Chinese media
gave due prominence. Beijing’s attempts to manipulate German opinion and
policy via invitation diplomacy became controversial in Germany. Many
Germans resented what they considered to be Chinese interference in FRG
internal affairs. Others saw it as an attempt to inflame Soviet-German ten-
sions to Beijing’s advantage.
The effectiveness of China’s efforts to influence Germany is an inter-
esting if ultimately unanswerable question. By the early 1980s, German
opinion was in fact shifting in the direction Beijing desired—toward greater
vigilance against the Soviet Union. Helmut Schmidt himself was the first
European leader to propose in 1977 that NATO deploy a counter to the
Soviet SS-22 intermediate-range missile deployed in East Europe, a move
adopted by NATO in December 1979 and which led to actual deployment of
US intermediate-range missiles in 1982–1983 against very strong opposition.
To what extent did Beijing’s efforts contribute to this gradual sea change in
German opinion? Schmidt had long clashed with the left wing of his SDP
party over defense issues. Moreover, Soviet actions, especially its December
1979 invasion of Afghanistan and its 1981 threat to invade Poland, were prob-
ably the most important factor. But it may be that an influential and respected
voice coming from a source other than Washington—namely, Beijing—gave
credibility to warnings about Soviet intentions. It is ironic, however, that by
the time West German leaders were facing down very strong opposition to
US deployments of theater nuclear forces circa 1982–1984, Beijing had shifted
positions and was backing away from the concept of a global struggle against
Soviet expansionist social imperialism, and toward a search for rapproche-
ment with the Soviet Union. But this may itself be taken as testament to the
effectiveness of China’s policy. Confronted by increased resolution in Europe,
due marginally to China’s efforts, Moscow was compelled to become less hos-
tile toward China.China’s Second Global CampaignThe PRC’s 1970s push to build a global coalition to counter Soviet advances
constituted Beijing’s second effort to influence the evolution of the global
correlation of forces. The first had been Beijing’s 1960s effort to advance
world revolution via Marxist-Leninist-led transitions to socialism and com-
munism. The policy content of these two efforts differed greatly, but both
were impressive deployments of national capabilities on a global basis and
in accord with a broad strategic vision in an effort to create a world more
in line with what China’s leaders perceived as China’s interests. Both efforts
were based on a global analysis of China’s situation and entailed a sustained,