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April–early June 1989) a national uprising demanding that the CCP chart an
even bolder course for civic freedom and democracy, and abandoning the po-
litical aspect of its Leninist legacy.
An ideological vacuum developed in China during the 1980s.^10
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought lost credibility with a wide swath
of the Chinese people as opening brought a flood of previously forbidden
knowledge about the high levels of wealth and freedom of the advanced cap-
italist countries. The Chinese people became aware of how poor and unfree
they actually were. Liberal ideals of rule of law, freedom of speech, associa-
tion, assembly, and democracy flowed into China with Western business-
men, academic exchanges, tourism, movies, and publications. On the other
hand, the party’s ideological apparatus continued to rely on Marxist-Leninist
themes, which had less and less traction. Moreover, the narrative of national
humiliation was not yet systematically used to legitimize CCP authority. Into
this ideological vacuum flowed liberal ideas extolling political freedom and
democracy. The CCP general secretary from 1982 to 1987, Hu Yaobang, was
purged for failing to wage resolute ideological struggle against these “bour-
geois liberal” ideas.
The Mechanics of Opening to the Outside World
A series of pivotal top-level CCP meetings in 1978 decided that China would
open to the outside world. But how was this to be done? To a substantial
degree, the opening was a policy of experimentation. Various moves, often
proposed by lower-level units, were endorsed by central authorities and
then implemented by localities. If the results were positive in terms of eco-
nomic growth, technological acquisition, job creation, and revenue genera-
tion, the policies were often authorized on a broader scale. Yet this process
of pragmatic experimentation occurred within a broader conceptual frame-
work: learning from the positive experiences of the advanced capitalist coun-
tries to develop the PRC in the shortest time possible. Deng rejected the
radical Maoist notion that adopting science and technology from advanced
capitalist countries amounted to adopting capitalism. Science and technol-
ogy had no “class character” according to Deng, but could be developed and
used by any class. Under capitalism, they were developed and used by the
bourgeoisie. In socialist China, they would be developed and used by the
proletariat—to make socialist China rich and powerful. Chinese scholars
later developed a narrative placing China’s Maoist isolation and its post-Mao
opening in a deeper historical context. China had been strong when it was
open and drew deeply on the achievements of other peoples and civilizations,
according to this narrative. The Han, Tang, and early Ming and Qing dynas-
ties were identified as open and powerful periods. When China closed itself